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1 - 10 of 13 (0.32 seconds)The Income Tax Act, 1961
Section 2 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 9 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 66 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 96 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 102 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
The New Piecegoods Bazar Co., ... vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Bombay on 26 May, 1950
15. Before referring to other authorities of which there is a considerable number, I might with advantage mention the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of New Piecegoods Bazar Co., Ltd. Bombay v. Commr. of income-tax. Bombay, (1950) SCR 553 : (AIR 1950 SC 165) (B). Incidentally, that decision was given in an appeal from one of the four decisions named by the Tribunal in its appellate order. The case related to the charge created in respect of municipal property tax by Section 212, City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888 and the question being whether or not the charge was an "annual charge not being a capital charge" within the meaning of Section 9(1)(iv), Income-tax Act, their Lordships had occasion to decide what a 'capital charge' meant and also, to a certain extent, what was meant by an 'annual charge." 'Capital charge', they held, meant a charge created to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature; and an 'annual charge', they said, meant a charge to secure an annual liability. We are not concerned, in view of what I have already said, with the true meaning of the expression 'capital charge' in the present case. With regard to the epxression 'annual charge', all that the Supreme Court actually decided appears to have been that a charge, in order to be an 'annual charge', had to be a charge in respect of a payment to be made annually or to secure the discharge of an annual liability and that provided a charge was of that nature, it was, although of a variable or contingent character, none the less an 'annual charge'. The direct decision in the case does not appear to go beyond excluding the view that if a charge was of a variable character, that is to say, liable to be increased or reduced or of the nature of a contingent charge, it would not be an annual charge, as contemplated by Section 9 (1)(iv). What, however, "a payment to be made annually" or "an annual liability" really meant, namely, the positive concept underlying the terms, was not, so far as I can see, explained by the Supreme Court except perhaps indirectly and incidentally in two short paragraphs to which I shall refer later.
Raja Bejoy Singh Dudhuria vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 10 March, 1932
5. It appears that thereafter in course of the assessment for the year 1945-46, the assessee claimed a deduction of the payment of the amount of Rs. 9,600/- which he had paid to his wife as her alimony during the relevant accounting year. No reference appears to have been made before the Income-tax Officer to Section 9 (1) (iv), Indian Income-tax Act. The claim was put forward on the basis that an amount, equivalent to the amount payable to the wife as her alimony, had been diverted from the hands of the assessee to those of his wife before it could become the assessee's income. Quite obviously, the assessee was then shaping his case on the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Bijoy Singh Dudhuria v. Commr. of Income-tax, Calcutta . The assessee's contention did not find favour with the Income-tax Officer who held that there could be no question in the facts of the case of any overriding charge diverting the money from the hands of the assessee before it could become his income, because the charge was a voluntary imposition and there was nothing in it to bind the assessee absolutely.
Mrs. O.K. Smith vs Mr. H.P. Smith on 28 August, 1931
20. The same view was taken in the case of Smith v. Smith (No. 2) (1923) P. 191 (F). Once again, the payment concerned was a weekly payment and the question was whether it was an annual payment within Case III, 1(a), of Sch. D. to the Income-tax Act of 1918, so that if it was, the divorced husband, who was to make the payment, would be entitled to deduct income-tax under Rule 19 of the General Rules relating to All Schedules. The Court composed of Lord Sterndale M. R. and Warrington and "Scrutton, L. JJ. held unanimously that the payment, though required to be made in weekly sums, was an 'annual payment' and in taking that view, the learned Judges found it unnecessary to do more than simply refer to the two cases of (1917) WN 385 : 119 LT 303 (D) and (1918) 2 Ch 54 (E).