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Narayan Laxman Ayarkar And Ors. vs Vishnu Waman Dhawale And Anr. on 7 December, 1956

AIR 1932 Cal 241 and Narayan Laxman Ayarkar v. Vishnu Waman Dhawale, AIR 1957 Bom 117 has submitted that a decree can be enforced against a third person who is not a party to it and is bound by it. Having gone through the said judgments, in my opinion. the ratio laid down in those cases is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the aforesaid decisions deal with the rights of" sub-tenants and considering the facts of those cases, the Courts have laid down that the sub-tenants are not required to he heard. That is not the case on hand.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Superintendence Company Of India (P) ... vs Krishan Murgai on 9 May, 1980

he cannot ask for that right since there is a negative covenant in the agreement he would carry out. As stated above, since the entire line of argument of Mr. Vakil is based on the cause of action on common law and equity as against the express provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act. the question that arises is as to how far the principles laid clown by the English Courts on common law and equity are applicable to the present case. The Supreme Court in Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishun Murgai. AIR 1980 SC 1717 has considered this question and has ruled that while The Contract Act. 1872. docs not profess to be a complete code dealing with the law relating to contracts, to the extent the Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English Law dehors the statutory provision, unless the statute is such that it cannot be understood without the aid of the English Law. When a rule of English Law receives statutory recognition by the Indian Legislature, it is the language of the Act which determines the scope, uninfluenced by the manner in which the analogous provision comes to be construed narrowly, or otherwise modified, in order to bring the construction within the scope and limitations of the rule governing the English doctrine of restraint of the trade. In my view, this ruling of the Supreme Court gives complete answer to the submissions of Mr. Vakil and no further elaboration is necessary. In the said case, the Supreme Court has also ruled that under Section 27 of the Contract Act. a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service is void. In view of this settled position of law. is it open to the plaintiff to seek injunction against the defendants, especially when defendant, No. 3 was not in the service with the plaintiff? In other words, can defendant No. 3 be restrained for all times to come from using his Knowledge and experience which he gained during the course of his employment either with the plaintiff or for that matter with any other employer? The answer is certainly in the negative. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the defendant No. 3 being a qualified person possessing a degree of B.E. (Chem) and having obtained sufficient experience in the course of his employment either with the plaintiff or other companies. the experience being his assets, it is difficult at this stage to injunct him unless proper evidence is led that he has disclosed or divulged any secrecy or confidentiality reposed in him while he was in the service with the plaintiff company. The circumstances pointed out by the plaintiff that defendant No. 3, during the course of his employment with the plaintiff, had participated in the meetings relating to the invention of the new process of manufacturing AIP and ZnP and, immediately on his terminal ion, joined the defendants Nos. I and 2 and divulged all the information of manufacturing AIP and ZnP. and the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. in turn, in fact, are also manufacturing the same, prima facie, do not appear to be so strong enough to clinch the issue in favour of me plaintiff as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have conic out wilh a specific case that even prior to the defendant No. 3 joining the defendants Nos. I and 2. they were actually manufacturing AIP and ZnP by using white/yellow phosperous. As can be seen from the various bills of purchase of machinery and the licence dated 20-5-93 issued by the licensing authority for manufacture of AIP and ZnP by using white/yellow phosphorous, prima facie, it appears that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have in fact, been manufacturing the product in question even prior to the defendant No. 3 joining them. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to make out even a prima facie case in its favour and is therefore not entitled to the relief prayed for.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 67 - V D Tulzapurkar - Full Document

Importers And Manufacturers Ltd vs Pheroze Framroze Taraporewalaand ... on 10 December, 1952

17. Assuming that Mr. Vakil is right in his submission that in view of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3, defendant No. 3 i.s restrained from divulging or disclosing the secrecy of the new process, the question arises is as to how far the said agreement is binding lo defendants Nos, I and 2 who have allegedly started similar process of manufacturing AIP and SnP with the help or assistance of defendant No. 3. especially when they were not the parlies to the said agreement and how can a Court pass a decree against them because it is the specific content ion of defendants Nos. I and 2 that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 is not binding to them and no decree can he passed against them. Mr. Vakil. learned Counsel, after placing reliance on the decisions in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Phiroxe Framroze Taraporewala. (1953) 55 Bom LR 271 : (AIR 1953 SC 73).
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 54 - Full Document
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