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1 - 10 of 23 (0.33 seconds)Section 15 in Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act 1949 [Entire Act]
Section 446 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act 1949
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 115 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Prahlad Singh vs Col. Sukhdev Singh on 24 February, 1987
In Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh[8] an ex-parte decree passed in
a petition for eviction based on ground of default in payment of rent
was set aside on the finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw
the petition and accept rent from the tenant. After the decree was
set aside the petition for eviction was once again ordered on the
ground of default of payment of rent for the same period. The
submission of the tenant that the eviction petition could not be
allowed to continue and deserved to be dismissed on the finding of the
court in the proceeding for setting aside the ex parte order was
negatived by the High Court on the ground that those findings were
made in the context of setting aside the ex parte order and not in the
context of deciding the main petition for eviction.
C.V. Rajendran And Anr vs N.M. Muhammed Kunhi on 13 September, 2002
In C.V. Rajendran and another v. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi[9] the question
arose for consideration whether the order of remand passed by the Rent
Control Appellate Authority, Payyannur, dated November 25, 1988,
holding that the second eviction petition (R.C.P. No. 13/87) filed by
the respondent against the appellants under sub-section (3) of Section
11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, is not
barred by Section 15 of the Act, can be permitted to re-agitate in a
proceeding arising from the order passed by the Rent Controller
pursuant to the order of remand. Be it noted, in the said case,
learned Rent Controller had declined to grant relief to the respondent
on the ground that under Section 15(3) of the Act the eviction
petition was not maintainable. On appeal being preferred the
appellate authority remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for
fresh disposal. After remand, the Rent Controller found that the need
of the respondent was bona fide and alternative accommodation in the
area was available and, accordingly, allowed the eviction petition.
The same was affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. On a
civil revision being preferred the High Court opined that the earlier
order of the appellate authority holding that Section 15 of the Act
does not bar the eviction proceeding against the tenant, had become
final and could not be re-agitated. However, the High Court recorded
a finding that Section 15 of the Act did not bar the subsequent
eviction petition and being of that view dismissed the revision
petition. A contention was raised before this Court that order passed
by the appellate authority holding that the eviction petition was
maintainable and Section 15 of the Act was not a bar, does not operate
as res judicata. In that context, this Court observed as follows: -
Arukkani Ammal vs Guruswamy on 23 January, 1987
In this context, we may fruitfully
reproduce a passage from Arukkani Ammal v. Guruswamy[10]: -
Y.B. Patil And Ors vs Y.L. Patil on 23 August, 1976
In this regard, the pronouncement in Y.B. Patil and others v. Y.L.
Patil[12] is worth referring to. In that case the High Court in the
writ petition preferred on earlier point of time had recorded a
finding and gave directions to the tribunal not to reopen the question
of fact in revision and the tribunal complied with those directions of
the High Court. This Court opined that the appellants therein were
bound by the judgment of the High Court and it was not open to them to
go behind the judgment earlier passed by the High Court as they had
not preferred any appeal against the said judgment and it had attained
finality. The Court observed that it is well settled that principle
of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent
proceedings, they also got attracted in subsequent stage of the same
proceeding. The aforesaid decision has noted the fact that in the
earlier writ petition the High Court has clearly stated that the
tribunal shall not reopen the question of fact in revision. It is
manifest that, this Court has taken note of the fact that there was an
expression of opinion by the High Court that facts need not be
adverted to again by the tribunal and that attracted the principle of
res judicata.