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1 - 10 of 11 (0.22 seconds)V.M. Abdul Rahman vs D.K. Cassim And Sons on 19 December, 1932
The learned judge referred to the decision of the Privy council in Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons ([1933] L.R. 60 I.A. 76; A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 58, 60) and pointed out that the test applied in that case was that, "the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit : if after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it," and applying this test the Privy Council held that an order of remand was not a final order since it kept the entire case undecided.
The State Of Orissa vs Madan Gopal Rungta.The State Of ... on 25 October, 1951
Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 12) Shelat J. pointed out in Mohanlal's cease (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 733) that, though the order disposing of the writ petition did not determine the rights of the parties and was ex facie interlocutory in character, it was yet a final order "in view of the fact that with these orders the petition was disposed of finally and nothing further remained to be done in respect of the petition." The order made on the writ petition was held to be a final order because it had the effect of finally disposing of the writ petition.
Mukunda Das Nandy And Ors. vs Bidhan Chandra Roy And Ors. on 1 July, 1959
5. Considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the second respondent on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mukunda Das v. Bidhan Chandra Roy (A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 77, 80), in support of his contention that an order which does not decide questions arising in the appeal on merits but rejects the appeal on a preliminary ground cannot be said to be a final order. What happened in that case was that an appeal against a decision of the subordinate court was filed in the High Court and on a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the appeal lay to the District Court and not to the High Court, an order was passed by the High Court holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and that the appeal must be returned for presentation to the District Court which was the proper court having jurisdiction to entertain it. The question arose whether the decision of the High Court as to its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal without any decision on the merits of the controversy between the parties was final order within the meaning of article 133(1). A Division Bench of the High Court took the view that the order was not a final order since it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties but left them open for determination by the court of the District Judge in the appeal which was returned for presentation to the District Court. Lahiri C.J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, pointed out :
Gulabchand Gambhirmal vs Kudilal Govindram And Anr. on 24 November, 1958
We did not consider the merits of the appeal but rejected it on the ground that no appeal lay at the instance of the applicant. The order passed by us dismissing there appeal on this ground can in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or affirming the decision appealed from. When we took the view that the appeal did not lie at the instance of the applicant, it is difficult to see how it can be said that in rejecting the appeal we adopted or affirmed the decision of the company judge. This view which we rate taking is supported by a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Bharat High court in Gulabchand v. Kudilal Govindram (A.I.R. 1952 M.B. 149, 150 (F.B.)). The appeal in that case was dismissed by the court on the ground that no appeal lay under section 25 of the High court of Judicature Act, 1949, and the question arose whether the order dismissing the appeal on that ground was a final order affirming the decision of the court immediately below. Dixit J., delivering the main judgment, held that the order could not be regarded as an order affirming the decision of the court immediately below and the reasons he gave were :
Abdul Majid vs Jawahir Lal on 5 August, 1910
"In my opinion, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of this court dismissing the special appeal on the ground, that no appeal lay under section 25 of the Act, is not an order which affirms the decision dated December 2, 1948, of the Division Bench. It seems to me that the expression 'affirms the decision of the court immediately below' implies that the High Court has dealt judicial with the decision of the court below and upheld it. Where, as in the present case, the court holds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decision of the court below and rejects the appeal, it seems to be difficult to say that the decision of the court below is affirmed by the rejection of the incompetent appeal. This view receives some support from the decision of the Privy Council in Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal. ([1914] I.L.R. 36 All. 350; A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 66; 23 I.C. 649). In that case, their Lordships of the privy Council considered the question of the effect of the dismissal of an appeal in the Board for want of prosecution. Lord Moulton, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed :
Mahadeo Sahai vs Secy. Of State And Ors. on 24 November, 1931
'The order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit, and could, in no sense, be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely recognised authoritatively that the appellant had not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him and that, therefore, he was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all.'
It follows, a fortiori, from these observations that when an appeal is dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay, it cannot be said that the order dismissing the appeal is an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. This Privy council decision has not been referred to in the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Mahadeo Sahai v. Secretary of State ([1932] I.L.R. 54 All 390; A.I.R. 1932 All 312) and Beni Rai v. Ram Lakhan Rai ([1898] I.L.R. 20 All.
Beni Rai And Ors. vs Ram Lakhan Rai And Ors. on 14 April, 1898
'The order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit, and could, in no sense, be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely recognised authoritatively that the appellant had not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him and that, therefore, he was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all.'
It follows, a fortiori, from these observations that when an appeal is dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay, it cannot be said that the order dismissing the appeal is an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. This Privy council decision has not been referred to in the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Mahadeo Sahai v. Secretary of State ([1932] I.L.R. 54 All 390; A.I.R. 1932 All 312) and Beni Rai v. Ram Lakhan Rai ([1898] I.L.R. 20 All.
Article 133 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Mohanlal Nathubhai And Ors. vs R.M. Desai Development Commissioner, ... on 22 September, 1967
Now it is well settled that the word "judgment" in article 133(1) does not have the meaning given to it in the Code of Civil Procedure but it means a final judgment. The question which therefore arises for consideration is whether the decision of the appeal was a final judgment or order, the word "decree" being clearly inapplicable. Now what is a final judgment or order is no longer a matter of doubt or controversy. There are several decisions of the Supreme court dealing with the question as to when a decision can be said to be a final judgment or order but it is not necessary to refer to all of them since the latest decision of the Supreme Court on the point, namely, Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 733), exhaustively discusses this question. The main judgment in that case was delivered by Shelat J. and he divided the cases where this question may arise into two classes : one class comprising cases where the impugned order were passed in appeals or revisions from orders in the original or main proceedings and the other class comprising cases where the impugned orders were made in proceedings independent of the original or main proceedings. So far as the first class of cases is concerned, the learned judge pointed out that the test applied in decided cases was whether the impugned order disposed of the original proceeding; if it did, the order would be final; if it did not and the proceeding was alive, yet to be tried, the order would not be final.