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1 - 10 of 11 (0.30 seconds)Section 465 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 471 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 109 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 48 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Sawal Das vs State Of Bihar on 9 January, 1974
Mr. Roy has further drawn our attention to the decisions (Sawal Das v. State of Bihar) (Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh) (Yogendra v. State of Gujarat) (Onkar Nath's case) and has argued on the strength of these decisions that in a criminal case prosecution must stand on its own legs, that it could not take advantage of the weakness of the defence and that where the accused choses to adduce evidence, he may simply discharge his burden by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities in his favour with regard to the circumstances available to him. We have carefully gone through the decisions relied upon by Mr. Roy. We shall presently see that the prosecution in the three : cases before us has discharged its burden successfully by producing both parole (oral) and documentary evidence. Before we proceed to discuss the evidence on the record, we must make it clear that we are concerned here with a very peculiar case having a distinguishing feature of its own. We must remember that soon after 1947 a large number of refugees crossed the border of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and entered into this part of the country in a hopeless condition after leaving their hearth and home and all earthly belongings in East Bengal. The father of Sushil Kumar Dutta was admittedly one of such persons. Very naturally, therefore, the prosecution could not produce any ancestral document of the family of Sushil Kumar Datta to prove as to which caste the ancestors belonged. This is why we hear Sushil Kumar Dutta (D.W. 13) saying that he has not in his custody any document whatsoever to prove that they belong to the Namasudra Caste. Naturally, therefore, the prosecution had to depend to a large extent on the oral evidence on the record. The prosecution produced in all 21 witnessess. All these witnessess were believed by both the learned lower courts. We need not dilate upon the evidence adduced by all these witnessess. It would suffice our purpose to mention that both the lower courts arrived at a concurrent finding of fact. The courts found that Sushil Kumar Dutta is not a Namasudra. Mr. Roy wants us to interfere with this finding of fact. We have, therefore, asked ourselves as to whether that finding of fact regarding the caste of Sushil Kumar Dutta is altogether perverse such (so) that the f hiding cannot be justified by the overall facts, circumstances and materials placed on the record.
Section 49 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Pratap vs State Of U.P on 22 December, 1972
Mr. Roy has further drawn our attention to the decisions (Sawal Das v. State of Bihar) (Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh) (Yogendra v. State of Gujarat) (Onkar Nath's case) and has argued on the strength of these decisions that in a criminal case prosecution must stand on its own legs, that it could not take advantage of the weakness of the defence and that where the accused choses to adduce evidence, he may simply discharge his burden by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities in his favour with regard to the circumstances available to him. We have carefully gone through the decisions relied upon by Mr. Roy. We shall presently see that the prosecution in the three : cases before us has discharged its burden successfully by producing both parole (oral) and documentary evidence. Before we proceed to discuss the evidence on the record, we must make it clear that we are concerned here with a very peculiar case having a distinguishing feature of its own. We must remember that soon after 1947 a large number of refugees crossed the border of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and entered into this part of the country in a hopeless condition after leaving their hearth and home and all earthly belongings in East Bengal. The father of Sushil Kumar Dutta was admittedly one of such persons. Very naturally, therefore, the prosecution could not produce any ancestral document of the family of Sushil Kumar Datta to prove as to which caste the ancestors belonged. This is why we hear Sushil Kumar Dutta (D.W. 13) saying that he has not in his custody any document whatsoever to prove that they belong to the Namasudra Caste. Naturally, therefore, the prosecution had to depend to a large extent on the oral evidence on the record. The prosecution produced in all 21 witnessess. All these witnessess were believed by both the learned lower courts. We need not dilate upon the evidence adduced by all these witnessess. It would suffice our purpose to mention that both the lower courts arrived at a concurrent finding of fact. The courts found that Sushil Kumar Dutta is not a Namasudra. Mr. Roy wants us to interfere with this finding of fact. We have, therefore, asked ourselves as to whether that finding of fact regarding the caste of Sushil Kumar Dutta is altogether perverse such (so) that the f hiding cannot be justified by the overall facts, circumstances and materials placed on the record.