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1 - 10 of 10 (0.20 seconds)Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr vs M/S Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr on 28 January, 2002
13. These principles were reiterated in a number of judgments, but we shall cite only one more judgment in State Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills, AIR 2002 SC 834 (Paragraph 10), where the Supreme Court says:
A. K. Kraipak & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 29 April, 1969
" 10. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969 (2) SCC 262).. Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities, it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred".
Kanpur University And Others vs Samir Gupta And Others on 27 September, 1983
In the latter judgment, at paragraph 23, the Division Bench of this Court, following the Supreme Court in Samir Gupta (supra), took the view that it is imperative that the answers to the questions indicated must not carry1 two correct answers. It also noted the representations made in the different paragraphs of the prospectus, which are almost identical with the ones we find in the current prospectus, and, therefore, deleted the questions which were described by the Supreme Court-as 'suspect questions'. The same principle is adopted in the judgment in O.P. No. 22631 of 2001.
Smt. Vinitha Ashok vs Lakshmi Hospital & Ors on 25 September, 2001
22. Mr. T.R. Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in O.P. No. 16123 of 2002 referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinitha Ashok v. Lakshmi Hospital, (2001) 8 SCC 731, Madan Copal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204, Asiatic S.N. Co. v. Arabinda, AIR 1959 SC 597 and Haji Mohammed v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 488 and contended that these judgments indicate without doubt that no expert opinion is binding on the court and the court is always under a duty to assess the expert opinion and form its own judgment in the matter. The principle as stated is unexceptionable, but we notice that all these are cases where there is a trial - civil or criminal - held in the matter. If the matter were in the realm of a trial, where expert opinion is adduced as evidence and subjected to cross-examination by the challenging party, undoubtedly, the principle canvassed by the learned counsel would be the correct principle to be adopted. We are however, in the realm of a petition for certiorari where the parameters and the roles are quite distinct and different. We have already indicated in detail what the approach of the court should be. In any event, there was no trial in the instant case and therefore, these authorities are of no assistance in deciding the matter.
Tata Cellular vs Union Of India on 26 July, 1994
ER 680 reiterated by the Court in England, was approved by the Supreme Court and applied in a number of cases including Tata Cellular supra. Wednesbury principle is simple "A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it". Finally, the Supreme Court, (vide paragraph 94), enunciated the deducible principles on the subject of judicial review as: (1) the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action, (2) the court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made, (3) the court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible, (4) a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness, but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides, (5) quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgetted expenditure."
The Asiatic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd vs Sub-Lt. Arabinda Chakravarti on 12 January, 1959
22. Mr. T.R. Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in O.P. No. 16123 of 2002 referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinitha Ashok v. Lakshmi Hospital, (2001) 8 SCC 731, Madan Copal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204, Asiatic S.N. Co. v. Arabinda, AIR 1959 SC 597 and Haji Mohammed v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 488 and contended that these judgments indicate without doubt that no expert opinion is binding on the court and the court is always under a duty to assess the expert opinion and form its own judgment in the matter. The principle as stated is unexceptionable, but we notice that all these are cases where there is a trial - civil or criminal - held in the matter. If the matter were in the realm of a trial, where expert opinion is adduced as evidence and subjected to cross-examination by the challenging party, undoubtedly, the principle canvassed by the learned counsel would be the correct principle to be adopted. We are however, in the realm of a petition for certiorari where the parameters and the roles are quite distinct and different. We have already indicated in detail what the approach of the court should be. In any event, there was no trial in the instant case and therefore, these authorities are of no assistance in deciding the matter.
The University Of Mysore And Anr vs C. D. Govinda Rao And Anr on 26 August, 1963
23. Mr. Babu Karukappadath, appearing for the appellant in W.A. No. 1881 of 2002 drew our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao (AIR 1965 SC 491) (paragraphs 12and 13) to highlight the principle that the power of judicial review has to be sparingly used in academic matters where expert opinion has been rendered and the court should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by the experts in the absence of any allegations of mala fides and that it would be wise and safe for the courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts generally can be. That is precisely the principle on which we have to judge the present case.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Madan Gopal Kakkad vs Naval Dubey And Anr on 29 April, 1992
22. Mr. T.R. Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in O.P. No. 16123 of 2002 referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinitha Ashok v. Lakshmi Hospital, (2001) 8 SCC 731, Madan Copal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204, Asiatic S.N. Co. v. Arabinda, AIR 1959 SC 597 and Haji Mohammed v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 488 and contended that these judgments indicate without doubt that no expert opinion is binding on the court and the court is always under a duty to assess the expert opinion and form its own judgment in the matter. The principle as stated is unexceptionable, but we notice that all these are cases where there is a trial - civil or criminal - held in the matter. If the matter were in the realm of a trial, where expert opinion is adduced as evidence and subjected to cross-examination by the challenging party, undoubtedly, the principle canvassed by the learned counsel would be the correct principle to be adopted. We are however, in the realm of a petition for certiorari where the parameters and the roles are quite distinct and different. We have already indicated in detail what the approach of the court should be. In any event, there was no trial in the instant case and therefore, these authorities are of no assistance in deciding the matter.
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