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1 - 10 of 10 (0.24 seconds)Section 6 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 25 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 41 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 145 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 3 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 23 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 146 in Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Deo Nandan Pershad vs Meghu Mahton on 14 December, 1906
18. As regards the argument that the demand for rent under Ex. 3 would itself constitute an admission to possession as a ryot, that might have been so, if the persons so demanded accepted their liability under the demand. Such a demand can only be used as an element from which implied tenancy can be deduced, but it is not by itself enough to constitute tenancy. (See Deo Nundan Pershad v. Meghu Mahton, 34 Cal. 57: (5 C. L. J. 181)). In the present case out of the three persons from whom the rent was demanded, two, that is, plaintiffs 4 and 5 deny that they ever had any possession and plaintiff 3 repudiates that he was in any way bound by the lease, Ex. J, and claims to have been in independent possession hostilely to defendant 1. It is, therefore, impossible to treat this demand Ex. 3 as in any way helping the plaintiffs.
Venkatachala Naidu vs Ethirajammal on 11 August, 1920
2-J and 3 can be treated as amounting to admission to possession as a ryot. Under Ex. 2 no doubt it is recited that the present plaintiffs 3, 4 and 5 will retain the suit lands as defendant 1's tenant until Magh full-moon day of Fasli 1337 and deliver 1/2 share of the produce of the suit-lands to defendant 1 and then deliver up possession to defendant 1 within 15 days thereafter. It is hardly right to construe this as amounting to an admission to possession as a ryot, merely from the lax use of the word "tenant". It has been held in the case in Venkatachala Naidu v. Ethirajammal, A. I. R. (8) 1921 Mad. 65 : (44 Mad. 220), that Section 6 does not apply to a mere trespasser in possession of the suit lands. The suit against the plaintiffs by defendant 1 which ended in compromise was filed on the footing that they were trespassers. The fact that they were permitted to continue in possession to realise the crops that they had already raised, cannot be construed as an admission to ryoti possession.
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