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1 - 10 of 51 (0.29 seconds)The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Section 14 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Thatha Gurunadham Chetti vs Thatha Navaneethamma (Died) And Anr. on 30 September, 1966
68. The decision in Narayan Patra V. Tara Patrani A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 131, follows the decision of Natesan, J. in Thatha Gurunadham Chetti v. Smt. Thatha Navaneethamma I.L.R. (1968) 1 Mad. 567 : (1967) 1 M.L.J. 454, already referred to. With respect, I have to make the same observations regarding the reasons contained in the decision of the Orissa High Court. The extreme view that the right to maintenance is wholly unrelated to the properties and the Hindu woman has no semblance of right to the properties so as to hold that Section 14(2) alone would apply, is not correct.
Sasadhar Chandra Day And Ors. vs Sm. Tara Sundari Dasi And Ors. on 8 February, 1962
This aspect is dealt with by the learned Judge at page 771 in which he has extracted the observations of Mallick, J., in Sasadhhar Chandra Dev v. Sm. Tara Sundari Dasi . The same view was also expressed in a recent Bench decision of the Patna High Court.
Gadam Reddayya vs Varapula Venkataraju And Anr. on 14 July, 1964
It is to be mentioned that at page 372 the learned Judge distinguished the earlier decision in Gadam Peddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju , on the ground that that decision was not a case where there was no obligation, thereby implying that if it was a right against the family properties, Section 14(2) would not apply. With respect, I am unable to agree with some of the observations, in this decision to the effect that in the case of allotment of properties in lieu of maintenance, there can be no notion of any pre-existing right in or over the properties. Indeed the learned Judge, in his discussion in the earlier portion of the judgment, was inclined to take the view that if the Hindu female had a claim for maintenance against the family properties and not merely a personal claim different considerations would apply ruling out Section 14(2).
Somthim Veerabhadra Rao And Anr. vs Duggirala Lakshmi Devi on 30 September, 1964
61. The other decision in Somthim Veerabhadra Rao v. Duggirala Lakshmi Devi , in that same volume is the judgment of Ekbote, J., at page 367, to which reference has already been made. The important point to be noted in that decision is that the learned Judge recognises that Section 14(2) will not apply if properties are given in lieu of maintenance to a woman who would have a claim against the properties in the hands of other parties and that if the obligation (to maintain is not there) and if in such a situation properties were given in lieu of maintenance Section 14(2) would apply. That was a case in which the paternal grandson gave some properties to his paternal grandmother (out of his own self-acquired property) and there was only a personal obligation. It was therefore that Section 14(2) applied. At top of page 371 the learned Judge points out the distinction between a right to maintenance as against the family properties and a mere personal obligation.
Section 52 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Rangaswami Naicker vs Chinnammal And Anr. on 23 July, 1963
31. The Bench decision of this Court reported in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal , referred to earlier, is binding on. me. Even so, the reason why in the preceding discussion I have referred to the wealth of case-law in which the rule of ejusdem generis was held to govern in the interpretation of Section 14(2) is that this aspect has not been adverted to in some of the decisions dealing with arrangements and allotment of properties in lieu of maintenance. In my view the reason why the Legislature deliberately excluded in Section 14(2) property acquired by a Hindu female, by inheritance, at a partition or in lieu of maintenance, is very significant and affords a conclusive answer to the interpretation of the word "acquired" in Sub-section (2). The Legislature is well aware that in the case of inheritance or partition there is undoubtedly a pre-existing right, "right" with regard to the property as such, and so there can be no question that property acquired by inheritance or partition should not be included under Section 14(2), as it is not a fresh route of title - the idea being that if the Hindu female had already a pre-existing right over the properties in her possession either by inheritance or partition, she should become the absolute owner and Sub-section (2) should leave those cases totally unaffected.
Badri Pershad vs Smt. Kanso Devi on 26 August, 1969
53. At this stage, I want to refer again to the important aspect which has been adverted to in some of the decisions including the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi1, in which it is emphasised that the object of Section 14 is only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees. This note of warning, will have to be applied with caution so as not to defeat the provisions of the Act. The Court must take an overall picture of the entire situation and determine, whether the predominent idea, in the transaction is in the realm of Hindu Law, and restraints are imposed on women in view of the prevalent notions existing then, or is the transaction predominently in the realm of contracts. There is bound to be overlapping and in the same field considerations of Hindu Law or alternatively the effect and operation of individual contracts may operate. In either of the categories of the arrangements the notion of a contract is substantially involved and so the problem cannot be solved in the abstract. It will have to be solved in the light of all the facts and circumstances, in particular, bearing in mind that the Explanation refers to acquisitions and grants even from third parties and strangers and the word 'limited owner' in the section is not used in the sense of a Hindu female necessarily linked up with the notion of a reversionary succession, but to denote a mere limited owner, in contrast to the notion of an absolute owner.