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1 - 3 of 3 (0.19 seconds)Datar Switchgears Ltd vs Tata Finance Ltd. & Anr on 18 October, 2000
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Datar
Switchgears Ltd. vs. Tata Finance Ltd. and Anr. (2000)8 SCC 151
and Punj Lloyd Ltd. vs. Petronet MHB Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638 and
the order dated February 27, 2009 in Arbitration Case No.80 of 2006
titled as M/s Bhagwan Dass & Sons vs. Union of India, to contend
that after the filing of the present application u/s 11(6) of the Act, the
right of the respondents to appoint an Arbitrator stands extinguished.
Therefore, the Arbitrator appointed by the respondents on 5-2-2004
cannot take cognizance of the dispute to adjudicate the same. It is
contended that the society was impleaded through its President in
the original petition itself therefore, the plea that the President is
required to be impleaded separately is not tenable. It is contended
that in any case, the President by designation has been impleaded
subsequently therefore, the objection does not stand. It was further
argued that authority to appoint an Arbitrator is required to be
impleaded if the Arbitral Tribunal is to be appointed by third person or
an institution and not where the Arbitrator is required to be appointed
by party to the Agreement itself.
M/S. Bhagwan Dass And Sons vs Union Of India on 29 September, 2000
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Datar
Switchgears Ltd. vs. Tata Finance Ltd. and Anr. (2000)8 SCC 151
and Punj Lloyd Ltd. vs. Petronet MHB Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 638 and
the order dated February 27, 2009 in Arbitration Case No.80 of 2006
titled as M/s Bhagwan Dass & Sons vs. Union of India, to contend
that after the filing of the present application u/s 11(6) of the Act, the
right of the respondents to appoint an Arbitrator stands extinguished.
Therefore, the Arbitrator appointed by the respondents on 5-2-2004
cannot take cognizance of the dispute to adjudicate the same. It is
contended that the society was impleaded through its President in
the original petition itself therefore, the plea that the President is
required to be impleaded separately is not tenable. It is contended
that in any case, the President by designation has been impleaded
subsequently therefore, the objection does not stand. It was further
argued that authority to appoint an Arbitrator is required to be
impleaded if the Arbitral Tribunal is to be appointed by third person or
an institution and not where the Arbitrator is required to be appointed
by party to the Agreement itself.
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