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1 - 10 of 49 (6.85 seconds)Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 57 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 148 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 365 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Machhi Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab on 20 July, 1983
49) In the light of the above principles, let us examine the
reasoning of the Trial Judge and its confirmation by the
High Court in awarding death sentence. Before the Trial
Court, High Court and even before us the learned amicus
curiae appearing on behalf of the accused Mulla and
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Guddu argued that the offences alleged to have committed
by these persons cannot come in the category for which
they may be punished with death sentence. She also
pointed out that neither they have any criminal history
nor the prosecution could show that the accused Mulla
and Guddu were involved in dacoity/gang or taken part in
any criminal activities prior to the occurrence of the
present case. Learned amicus curiae further pointed out
that even the one incident pressed into service by the
prosecution ended in acquittal. On the other hand, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the State by pointing
various instances how the five persons were killed
mercilessly by these accused, pleaded that no sympathy
or leniency should be afforded to these persons and
prayed for confirmation of the death sentence as awarded
by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. We
have already quoted the Constitution Bench decision in
Bachhan Singh (supra) and three-Judge Bench decision
in Machhi Singh (supra) to the effect that in the case of
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murder, "life imprisonment is a rule and imposition of
death sentence is an exceptional one" and the same
should come within the purview of "rarest of rare
category". We have already noted that the accused Mulla
is of the age 50 years and Guddu is of the age 30 years at
the time of committing the offence in question. No
material was placed or available about the family
background of these two accused and whether these
persons are married or not and about the family
circumstance etc. Learned amicus curiae fairly stated that
no family member ever approached during the entire
proceedings enquiring these appellants. The perusal of
the case records also shows that no one is depending on
them and no family responsibility is on the shoulders of
these accused persons.
State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr vs Kailash Chand Mahajan And Ors on 20 February, 1992
She
further pointed out that inasmuch as in the case of State
vs. Kailash Chandra & Ors. though she claimed to be a
victim, she deposed before the Court that the present
accused Mulla and Guddu have nothing to do with the
earlier incident. In such circumstances, according to the
amicus curiae she is not competent to narrate the present
incident and implicate the very same accused. On going
through her entire evidence, we are unable to accept the
stand taken by amicus for the following reasons: About
the first incident, namely, setting fire to her house, she
informed the court that six years earlier when she was at
her matrimonial home at Surjapur, three criminals came
there and set the roof of her house on fire. At the time,
when she was in her house and male members had gone
to extinguish the fire, the criminals forcibly took her away
with them. This incident took place at 1.00 a.m. in the
midnight. They had taken her to the nearby forest. She
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further explained, that on the third day on which they had
taken her away, after the sunset when it had become
dark, eight miscreants armed with guns and torches
reached near the tubewell of the village. She and other
girl and a boy who were brought from somewhere were
with them. There the criminals had caught eight persons
and made them to sit at tubewell and they were asking
them to bring Rs.10,000/- each then only they would be
released. The accused persons had assaulted two to three
persons by the butt of the gun and they were having torch
lights. After keeping them for one hour, they released
three persons and told them to bring Rs.10,000/- each
and threatened that only then the remaining five persons
would be released. After waiting for sometime since
nobody came from the village the miscreants took away
the said four men and one woman towards north. Nearly
after crossing two or three agricultural fields they killed
one person by slitting his throat by knife. Thereafter,
about 1 km. in the southern side of the village near a
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pond they took the remaining four persons, that is, three
men and one woman and killed them by cutting their
throat and left the dead bodies near a pond. She informed
that after leaving the dead bodies, they all went away.
She, however, managed to escape from the custody of the
said criminals after 10-12 days. Among the eight persons
who committed the crime at the tube-well one was Asha
Ram, Ram Sebak, Guddu, Mulla and Tulla whose names
she came to know since she was with them for 10-12
days. She asserted that Mulla had killed three persons
and Guddu had killed two persons. She pointed out that
she can recognize the accused Guddu, Mulla and Tulla by
face and by name and she also identified them when
Mulla and Guddu were present in the Court.
Daya Singh vs State Of Haryana on 20 February, 2001
27) In the case of Daya Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2001) 3 SCC 468, the test identification parade was held
after a period of almost eight years inasmuch as the
accused could not be arrested for a period of 7-1/2 years
and after the arrest the test identification parade was held
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after a period of six months. It was pointed out that the
purpose of test identification parade is to have the
corroboration to the evidence of the eye witnesses in the
form of earlier identification. It was held that the
substantive evidence is the evidence given by the witness
in the Court and if that evidence is found to be reliable
then the absence of corroboration by the test identification
is not material. It was further held that the fact that the
injured witnesses had lost their son and daughter-in-law
showed that there were reasons for an enduring
impression of the identity on the mind and memory of the
witnesses.
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Kriparam on 25 September, 2003
"It will thus be seen that the evidence of identification
has to be considered in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case. Though it is desirable to
hold the test identification parade at the earliest
possible opportunity, no hard and fast rule can be laid
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down in this regard. If the delay is inordinate and there
is evidence probablising the possibility of the accused
having been shown to the witnesses, the Court may not
act on the basis of such evidence. Moreover, cases
where the conviction is based not solely on the basis of
identification in court, but on the basis of other
corroborative evidence, such as recovery of looted
articles, stand on a different footing and the court has
to consider the evidence in its entirety."
Anil Kumar vs State Of U. P on 13 February, 2003
30) In another case of Pramod Mandal v. State of
Bihar, 2004 (13) SCC 150, placing reliance on the case of
Anil Kumar (supra), this Court observed that it is neither
possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule as to
the period within which a Test Identification Parade must
be held, or the number of witnesses who must correctly
identify the accused, to sustain his conviction. These
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matters must be left to the Courts of fact to decide in the
facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is laid
down prescribing a period within which the Test
Identification Parade must be held, it would only benefit
the professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are
delayed as the police have no clear clue about their
identity, they being persons unknown to the victims. They
therefore, have only to avoid their arrest for the prescribed
period to avoid conviction. Similarly, there may be offences
which by their very nature may be witnessed by a single
witness, such as rape. The offender may be unknown to
the victim and the case depends solely on the
identification by the victim, who is otherwise found to be
truthful and reliable. What justification can be pleaded to
contend that such cases must necessarily result in
acquittal because of there being only one identifying
witness? Prudence therefore demands that these matters
must be left to the wisdom of the courts of fact which
must consider all aspects of the matter in the light of the
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evidence on record before pronouncing upon the
acceptability or rejection of such identification.