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Bipinbhai Vadilal vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Gujarat-I on 6 March, 1980 cites

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, ... vs Bipinbhai Vadilal on 20 February, 1976

As a matter of fact, so far as the present case is concerned, there is a clear concession made by the assessee as recorded by the Division Bench of this court in its order in Income-tax References No. 155 (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal [1978] 113 ITR 664) and 162 of 1974 that the remuneration was not earned by utilising the family assets or funds nor with the aid or assistance of those funds. The division Bench has clearly referred to that concession in the following terms (p. 671) :
Gujarat High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai And Others vs Desai Mallappa And Others on 9 February, 1961

"To pronounce on the question of law presented for our decision, we must first examine what is the true scope of the doctrine of throwing into the 'common stock' or 'common hotchpot'. It must be remember that a Hindu family is not a creature of a contract. As observed by this court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai mallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1268, the doctrine of throwing into common stock inevitably postulates that the owner of a separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property. The existence of a coparcenary property is absolutely necessary before a coparcener can throw into the common stock his self-acquired properties. The separate property of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein. The separate property of a Hindu ceases to be separate property and acquires the characteristics of joint family or his ancestral property not by any physical mixing with his joint family or his ancestral property but by is own volition and intention by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property."
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 129 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax Madhya ... on 11 August, 1970

26. In this state of the record, we are afraid, we cannot agree with the first limb of the contention of the learned advocate for the assessee that there was no concession made in fact as recorded by the Division Bench. If the concession was made, and we are in no doubt that such a concession was made having regard to what we have set out above, there is no scope for pressing in service the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Iyer's case [1969] 73 ITR 539 (SC) or Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji's case [1970] 78 ITR 33. We must, therefore, reject the first limb of his contention.
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 100 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Rajanikanta Pal vs Jagamohan Pal on 23 January, 1923

The decision of the Privy Council in Rajanikanta Pal v. Jagamohan Pal, AIR 1923 PC 57, was referred to where the Privy Council held that where a member of a joint Hindu family blends his self-acquired property with property of the joint family, either by bringing his self-acquired property into a joint family account, or by bringing joint family property into his separate account, the effect is that all the property so blended becomes a joint family property. Gajendragadkar J. thereafter posed the question whether this doctrine was applicable in regard to property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner and found it difficult to answer the question in the affirmative. He held as under (p. 1271 of AIR 1961 SC) :
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 22 - Full Document

Pushpa Devi vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, New Delhi on 30 August, 1977

30. The scope and width of the doctrine of blending again came to be examined by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi v. CIT [1977] 109 ITR 730, where a question arose whether a female member of a joint family is competent to blend her separate property of which she may be an absolute owner with joint family property, or whether such right to blend was limited to coparceners only.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 50 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document

Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Gujarat on 28 April, 1961

In Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel v. CIT [1962] 44 ITR 266 (Guj), a question arose whether after the throwing into hotchpotch of a self-acquired property, a subsequent partition of the properties, including the one thrown into hotchpotch, amounted to a transfer of property within the meaning of s. 16(3)(a)(iii) and (vi) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. The Division Bench of this court, speaking through K. T. Desai C.J., referred to this well-known proposition of Hindu law that a separate or self-acquired property can, by being thrown into common stock with the intention of abandoning separate claims upon it, be converted into joint family property.
Gujarat High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

G. Narayana Raju vs G. Chamaraju & Others on 19 March, 1968

In our opinion, the aforesaid letter does not warrant the conclusion that there was a clear intention on the part of the assessee to treat the income of the remuneration as the income of his HUF. The only direction which is contained in the letter is to credit then onwards the managing director's remuneration and the director's fees which were due and payable to the assessee to the account of the HUF in the books of the company. In our opinion, neither the letter nor the entries in pursuance thereof constituted a cogent and satisfactory piece of evidence which can be said to manifest a deliberate volition and intentional conduct to treat his income of remuneration and director's fees as coparcenary property. The separate property of a Hindu coparcener "ceases to be his separate property and acquires the characteristic of joint family or ancestral property not by mere act of physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral but his own volition and intention by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as a separate property (vide G. Narayana Raju's case, AIR 1968 SC 1276). It cannot be contended by any stretch of imagination, with violence to the language, that the mere direction given by the assessee to the company, to credit the income of his remuneration and director's fees in his HUF's account and the credit entries made in pursuance thereof by the company, can be said to be sufficient for justifying an inference that the assessee had waived or surrendered his special right in it as a separate property. Since there is no other evidence except this letter and the entries made in pursuance thereof in the books of account of the company as well as the HUF, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has failed to consider any other relevant evidence in that behalf. The third contention, therefore, stands rejected.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 70 - V Ramaswami - Full Document
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