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1 - 10 of 12 (0.22 seconds)Section 31 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [Entire Act]
Section 28 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Inderjit Singh Grewal vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 23 August, 2011
In this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has taken note of the aforesaid earlier judgment in the case
of Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab (supra) and thereupon
it is found that while considering complaints under the D.V. Act,
the concept of continuing cause of action needs to be applied. In
the said case, a contention regarding limitation was raised in the
backdrop of prayer of the aggrieved person (wife) for return of
Stridhan. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after relying upon earlier
judgments, held that a continuing offence is one which is
susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which
is committed once and for all. It was found that retention of
Stridhan by the husband and his family members was a continuing
offence, so long as it was covered under the expression of
"economic abuse" as defined under Section 3 of the D.V. Act,
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pertaining definition of "Domestic Violence".
Section 468 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 3 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [Entire Act]
Section 12 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [Entire Act]
Krishna Bhatacharjee vs Sarathi Choudhury And Anr on 20 November, 2015
In the said
judgment in the case of Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi
Choudhury and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
specifically held that the concept of continuing offence gets
attracted from the date of deprivation of Stridhan and that
therefore, an application in that context would have to be
entertained and it cannot be thrown out on the ground of
limitation. This Court is of the opinion that the definition of
domestic violence under Section 3 of the D.V. Act shows that
depriving an aggrieved person of not only Stridhan but also
shared household, maintenance, alienation from assets, banks
lockers etc, prevention from entering place of employment of the
aggrieved person, would all be covered, under the concept of
continuing offences. Therefore, merely because the wife in the
present case was, according to her, driven out on 03.02.2011 and
the complaint was filed after one year i.e. on 17.10.2012, it
cannot be said that the complaint is barred by limitation. The
concepts of continuing cause of actions and continuing offences
would apply and the contention raised on behalf of the husband
relying upon Section 468 Cr.P.C. cannot be accepted. Thus, it is
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found that the complaint of the wife cannot be thrown out on the
ground of limitation, despite applicability of the Cr.P.C. as per
Section 28 of the D.V. Act.