Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 6 of 6 (0.23 seconds)The Hindu Women's Rights To Property Act, 1937
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Thatha Gurunadham Chetti vs Thatha Navaneethamma (Died) And Anr. on 30 September, 1966
6. Provision for the maintenance of Nagammal had been made in the present case in the partition deed, Exhibit A-1, dated 25th July, 1919 whereby Krishnaswamy, Rajagopal, Venkatachalapathy and Venkatayyan had their family properties divided and provision has been made for the enjoyment of the present suit properties by Nagammal, wife of Rangaswami, for her life with a direction that those properties should revert back to Krishnaswami, Rajagopal, Venkatachalapathy and Venkatayyan on the death of Nagammal, who had died on 3rd October 1969. Having regard to the Explanation to Section 14(1), I would have agreed with the learned Counsel for the appellan that Nagammal got a right to enjoy the suit properties in lieu of her maintenance and that the properties would be property within the meaning of Section 14(1) of the Act, and Nagammal's right had got enlarged, if there had been no precedent. But, in Thatha Qurunadham Gketti v. Smt. Thatha Navaneethamma and mother one Guruviah Ghetty died about the year 1932 prior to the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, as in the present caw, leaving his widow Thatha Muniamma and four sons. The four sons partitioned their family properties in 1946 under a deed, dated 11th December, 1946, whereby they allotcd the properties described in Schedule A to that document to their mother Thatha Muniamma for her maintenance to be enjoyed by her without powers of alienation and those properties were to be taken after her death in the manner mentioned in the deed itself. The property involved in that case was to go to her ion Venkatachalam, at per that deed, on her death. But, after the death of Venkatachalam leaving a widow, the plaintiff in that suit, his mother Thatha Muniamma conveyed that property to her other son, Gurunathan Chetti. The widow of Venkatachalam filed a suit for a declaration that the conveyance, by her mother-in-law Thatha Muniamma in favour of her son Gurunathan Chetti was invalid in law. It was contended thai the limited right of Thatha Munimma became enlarged under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, and that Gurunadhan Chetti had become the owner by her conveyance. Natesan, J. has observed at page 458:
G. Venkatachala Odayar vs Ramachandra Odayar And Anr. on 8 November, 1960
This decision of Natesan, J., was followed by Alagiriswami, J., in Dhcama Odayar v. Ramachandra Mudaliar (1969) 1 M.L.J. 181 : 81 399. There the passage in the decision of Natesan, J., extracted above, had been extracted by the learned Judge and he has added:
Badri Pershad vs Smt. Kanso Devi on 26 August, 1969
The document, instrument, decree or award may in certain cases of its own force, create a restricted estate in property and may in certain other cases only re-state the restricted estate which the female Hindu possessed even prior to the date of the instrument, decree or award. Before applying Sub-section (2), the proper question to ask is, does the instrument or decree 'prescribe a restricted estate in the propery, or doe it merely acknowledge and recognise (and not prescribe) a pre-existing estate upon which the Hindu Law had imposed a restriction, because the holder of the estate was a woman? If before the date of the deed or the decree, she had no interest in the property and her only source of title is the deed or the decree, which confers upon her a restricted estate Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act will apply, and such a restricted estate will not be enlarged into an absolute estate under Sub-section (1) of Section 14. If, on the other hand, the source of her title is independent of the instrument or decree and she held a restricted estate even prior to the date of the instrument or decree and all that the instrument or decree docs is merely to recognise the pre-existing restricted estate of the female Hindu then Sub-section (1) of Section 14 would certainly operate upon the restricted estate and expand it into an absolute one. The Supreme Court in Badrt Pershad v. Kanto Devi has observed as follows:
1