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Ranganatha Industries (Since ... vs The State Of Karnataka Through Joint ... on 26 September, 2004
cites
Section 3 in Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 [Entire Act]
State Of Karnataka vs B. Raghurama Shetty Etc on 24 March, 1981
In STATE OF KARNATAKA v. B. RAGHURAM SHETTY this Court considering the same question gave an illustration whether wheat flour be called wheat and considered the distinction from the economic perceptive.....................................................In Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Asn. V. State of Rajasthan this Court considering whether flour, maida and suji derived from the wheat are not wheat' within the meaning of Section 14 of the CST Act. Held that flour, maida and suji are different and distinct goods from wheat. In other words, flour, maida and suji are not declared goods. Though flour, maida and suji are derived from wheat but they are not wheat.
The Factories Act, 1948
Russell Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs A. Chowdhury, Addl. Commissioner Of ... on 6 May, 1976
Now, the only other question that would arise for consideration is whether it was not permissible for the revisional authority to interfere against the order of assessment made by the assessing authority as he has followed the decision of the revisional authority who has under similar circumstances taken the view that there was no manufacturing process. No doubt, the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Russel Properties Pvt. Ltd. (supra) supports the contention of Sri Prasad that the subordinate authority is bound to follow the decision of the higher authority. In our view, the principle enunciated in the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. It is necessary to point out that the revisional authority who had passed the impugned order was also holding the post of Joint Commissioner. However, it is only by means of Act No. 5/1993 the post of Joint Commissioner was upgraded as Additional Commissioner with retrospective effect from 9th November 1992. Under these circumstances, the Joint Commissioner who has passed the impugned order was not holding the post below the rank of the Joint Commissioner who had decided the case of Habib Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Srirangapatna. Further, when the matter is required to be inquired into by this Court, ultimately, the question is whether the order passed by the assessing authority is legally sustainable. The conclusion reached by us above shows that the order passed by the assessing authority was legally unsustainable. Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act confers power on the Joint Commissioner to call for and examine the records in respect of a proceeding under the Act and if he considers that if any order passed therein by an officer who is not above the rank of a Deputy Commissioner is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, he may after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary pass such orders as circumstances of the case justify including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment or cancelling the assessment or directing fresh assessment. In the instant case, the order of assessment was made by an officer who was an entry tax officer and who was not above the rank of the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, it was permissible for the Joint Commissioner to call for records and examine the correctness of the order of assessment made by the entry tax officer and modify the same, provided he was satisfied that the order passed by the entry tax officer was erroneous in so far it was prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. If the order passed by the assessing authority was contrary to law and on account of that, if the tax which was leviable was unjustifiably exempt from levy of tax, there cannot be any doubt that the order passed by the assessing authority would be prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Merely because the assessing authority has relied upon a decision of the Joint Commissioner in the case of Habib Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., in our view, would not prevent the revisional authority from examining the correctness of the order passed by the assessing authority. The wrong order made by an assessing authority cannot remain unconnected on the ground that the assessing authority has followed an order made by an higher officer and the same binds the subordinate officers. Such principle, if upheld as correct in law, it will have serious consequence so far as the state revenue is concerned. Under these circumstances, if a revisional authority who is conferred with the power of examining the correctness of the orders passed by the subordinate officers, on such examination is satisfied that the decision of the subordinate officer is erroneous in law, even if he has followed the decision of the higher authorities, we are of the view that under these circumstances, it must be held that the revisional authority is within his jurisdiction to interfere against such a decision of the assessing authority/ subordinate officer. Therefore, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the third submission of Sri Prasad.
State Of A.P vs Modern Proteins Ltd on 26 April, 1994
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of M/s. Modern Proteins Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that since a separate commercial commodity comes into existence or emerges from the production or manufacture, it becomes a separate taxable entity or goods for the purpose of sales tax and the word 'manufacture' has got various shades of meanings and there may be a manufacture of a complicated object like the super constellation or there might be manufacture of a simple object like a toy kit and etc. At paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
M/S. B. Oil Mills Ltd vs Sales Tax Tribunal & Ors on 3 September, 1998
SCC 496; in the case of B.P. OIL MILLS LTD. v. SALES TAX TRIBUNAL AND ORS., 111 STC 188. He also relied upon the Solvent Extracted Oil, De-oiled Meal and Edible Flour (Control) Order, 1967.
Union Of India vs Delhi Cloth & General Mills on 12 October, 1962
"(30) The last argument is that the said definition only takes in the purchase of goods for use in the manufacture of goods but tax is imposed on the purchase of the goods for producing oil. To state it differently, oil is not manufactured out of oilseed but only produced. Reliance is placed upon the use of two words in the Act, viz., manufacturing or processing in the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 4 and Sub-section (5) thereof and the expression edible oils produced' in Entry 57 of Schedule -B to the Act and a contention is raised that the Act itself makes a distinction between manufacturing and processing and manufacturing and production and, therefore, oil is not manufactured but only produced from oil seeds. Support is sought to be derived from this argument from the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, . But a perusal of the judgment shows that this Court only held that refined oil produced out of seeds was only an intermediate stage in the manufacture and was, therefore, not liable to excise duty. On the other hand, the dictionary meaning of manufacture' is transform or fashion raw materials into a changed form for use'. When oil is produced out of the seeds the process certainly transforms raw material into different article for use. We cannot therefore, accept this contention."
Ganesh Trading Co., Karnal vs State Of Haryana And Anr. on 25 April, 1973
In Ganesh Trading Co. v. State of Haryana this Court considering whether the rice after de-husking remains to be paddy or whether liable to sales tax as rice it was held that it is true that rice was produced out of paddy but it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after de-housing. It had changed its identity. Rice is not known as paddy. It is misnomer to call rice as paddy. They are two different things in ordinary parlance. Hence, quite clearly when paddy is de-husked and rice is produced there has been a change in the identity of the goods. Accordingly, it was taxed as rice.
Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr on 28 July, 1981
In Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. this Court was to consider whether metal takes within its ambit the fabricated forms of metal all kinds of metals' including minerals, ores, metals, alloys and sheets. This Court held that metal was used under Section 3-A(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax 1948 in its primary sense, ie., in the form in which is marketable as the primary commodity and that the primary form and the forms fabricated from the primary form constitute two distinct commodities marketable as such and must be regarded as different commercial commodities.