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Chitra Talkies vs Durga Dass Mehta on 21 April, 1972

3. Sri M. Islam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the order passed by the revisional court dated 13.11.1997, on the ground that it is clear from the perusal of the compromise decree that in case the defendant defaults in complying with the condition of the compromise decree passed which was a special matter of the revision before the revisional court before whom the said compromise was arrived at. It will be open and available for execution, therefore, the view taken by the revisional court in allowing the revision suffers from manifest error of law. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents relied upon a decision of this Court in Chitra Talkies v. Darga Dass Mehta, AIR 1973 All 40. The relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment, which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners are quoted below :
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Narayanaswami Naidu And Ors. vs Rangaswami Naidu Add Ors. on 5 February, 1926

"7. I am inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor respondent that the new contract of tenancy entered into between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor by which a fresh tenancy in the cinema building was created in the latter's favour with effect from 1.8.1965 was not an adjustment of the decree in execution. My initial reaction was that the provisions of Rule 2, Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code were applicable only to a decree of any kind under which money was payable and the decree in execution in the instant case being one for the delivery of possession, those provisions were not attracted to it. This view of mine found support from a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu, AIR 1926 Mad 749.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

K. K. Chari vs R. M. Seshadri on 16 March, 1973

"14. It is true that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties (See K. K. Cha v. R. M. Seshadri. 1973 (3) SCR 691 : AIR 1973 SC 1311.) The Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. Thus, dispensing with further proof, on account of the compromise, the Court is to be satisfied about compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of fact of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings up to the stage when the compromise is effected.
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 84 - A Alagiriswami - Full Document

Konchada Ramamurthy Subudhi & Anr vs Gopinath Naik on 7 December, 1967

This was the crucial test according to the Supreme Court in Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (dead by his legal representatives) v. Gopinath Naik. AIR 1968 SC 919, for determining whether on the terms of the compromise it was possible to impute to the decree-holder an intention to create a fresh tenancy. In that case in a suit for ejectment the compromise decree was passed by the appellate court enabling the decree-holder by its terms to execute the decree after the judgment-debtor failed to pay "rent" for any three consecutive months.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 38 - S M Sikri - Full Document
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