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1 - 8 of 8 (0.20 seconds)Perianna Goundan vs Sellappa Goundan And Ors. on 20 October, 1938
4. Turning now to the main question whether the petitioner can be said to be a 'judgment-debtor' within the meaning of Section 19, it will be observed that the definition of that term in Section 2(10), Civil Procedure Code, as meaning "any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made" has not been incorporated in this Act. On the other hand, the definition of 'debt' in Section 3(iii) includes debts payable under a decree or order of a Court. According to the decision in Perianna v. Sellappa (1938) 2 M.L.J. 1068 : I.L.R. (1939) Mad. 218, the liability of the. petitioner as the purchaser of the properties subject to the mortgage decree is a 'debt' within the meaning of the Act. In these circumstances, if the contention of the respondent were to be accepted, it would have the startling result, that though the petitioner as well as his liability comes within the purview of Section 7 which provides that the debt 'shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter', that is, of Chapter II of the Act which contains the substantive provisions as to scaling down of debts, he would be excluded from such relief by reason of the 'procedure' provided in Section 19 for obtaining it being inapplicable to him. Oh the other hand, it stands to reason that the procedure provided in a statute for enforcement of the substantive rights conferred thereby should be construed as far as possible, so as to give effect to and not to nullify those rights. This is by no means in conflict with the principle we have often reiterated in connection with this Act, namely, that its provisions being of an expropriatory character should be strictly construed and its scope ought not to be extended beyond what is clearly and expressly indicated by its terms. In the absence of any definition this Act, there is no obvious reason why the term 'judgment-debtor' should not be understood as including a person whose liability is a 'debt' as defined by the Act, more especially as that definition includes a judgment-debt.
Section 2 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 146 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Shivbasappa Chinnappa Mughi vs Marigowda Huchangowda Achamatti on 13 December, 1933
6. This decision was followed by Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Matharasappa Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar (1919) 9 L.W. 596 and was referred to with approval by Wadia, J., in Shivbasappa Chinnappa v. Marigowda Huchangowda (1933) I.L.R. 58 Bom. 485.
S.M.S. Matharasappa Chettiar vs P.C. Muthu Chettiar on 6 January, 1919
6. This decision was followed by Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Matharasappa Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar (1919) 9 L.W. 596 and was referred to with approval by Wadia, J., in Shivbasappa Chinnappa v. Marigowda Huchangowda (1933) I.L.R. 58 Bom. 485.
Ganapathi Bhatta vs A.M.L. D'Sowza And Ors. on 24 April, 1940
7. The respondent's learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of Horwill, J., in Ganapathi Bhatta v. D'Sowza (1940) 2 M.L.J. 317, which no doubt supports his contention. The learned Judge held that the word 'judgment-debtor' in Section 19 must be understood in the sense defined in the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore a purchaser of the equity of redemption from a Receiver in the insolvency of a judgment-debtor was not entitled to apply under 'that section.
V. Thiruvengadam Pillai By Agent V. ... vs Doridla Subbiah And Anr. And B. Vencata ... on 12 January, 1912
8. We cannot agree with this view of that decision. The learned Judges there referred to the contention for the appellant before them based upon the definition of 'judgment-debtor' in the Code of Civil Procedure, and they expressly held in the passage quoted above that the word 'judgment-debtor' in Section 258 included those who claimed through or under him. Nor is there any change in this respect in the present Code, as the learned Judge appears to have supposed. The learned Judge also placed reliance upon Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Doridla Subbiah (1912) 13 I.C. 659, as expressly deciding the point. The case itself related to the right of a transferee of a decree to apply under Order 21, Rule 53 to execute the decree when such decree had been attached by a creditor of the decree-holder. In support of their conclusion that the assignee of an attached decree was not in the same position as the decree-holder himself for purposes of execution, the learned Judges observed:
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