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1 - 10 of 20 (0.30 seconds)Section 23 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Section 28 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
P.L. Anwar Basha vs M. Natarajan on 26 November, 1979
Therefore, in the light of Section 23 read with Section 131 of the 1958 Act and following the decision of this Court in P.L.Anwar Basha vs. M.Natarajan {AIR 1980 Mad. 56}, the Allahabad High Court held that the suit in that case, was maintainable for infringement, though the registration was obtained after the institution of the suit.
M/S Maruti Udyog Ltd vs Ram Lal & Ors on 25 January, 2005
In Maruti Udyog Ltd vs. Ram Lal {2005 (2) SCC 638}, the Supreme Court cautioned that a deeming provision cannot be pushed too far so as to result in an anomalous or absurd position.
State Of Maharashtra vs Laljit Rajshi Shah & Ors on 28 February, 2000
In State of Maharashtra vs. Laljit Rajshi Shah {2000 (2) SCC 699}, the Supreme Court held that in interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, the Court has to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corrollaries, to give effect to the fiction. But while doing so, the fiction is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of the Section by which it is created.
M/S. Meghraj Biscuits Industries Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise,U.P on 14 March, 2007
In Meghraj Biscuits Industries Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise {2007 (3) SCC 780}, the appellant before the Supreme Court was selling biscuits under the brand name "Meghraj", which happened to the registered trademark of another Company. The Department of Central Excise contended that the appellant was not eligible to the benefit of SSI Notification. It was contended before the Department that the Registrar of Trademarks granted registration on 30.6.2000, with retrospective effect from 30.9.1991, the date of the application and that therefore differential duty cannot be claimed. This contention was raised on the strength of retrospective effect given to the Certificate of Registration under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. But the Supreme Court rejected the said contention, holding that the deeming fiction created under the Trade Mark Law was based upon the principle of deemed equivalence to public user of such mark and that the deeming fiction cannot be extended to the Excise Law. Therefore, it is clear that a deeming fiction cannot be extended to a purpose not specifically provided for under the Act itself.
Alka Gupta vs Narender Kumar Gupta on 27 September, 2010
35. Coming to Order II, Rule 2, CPC, it is needless to point out that to invoke the same, both suits must have been on the same cause of action. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Alka Gupta vs. Narender Kumar Gupta {2010 (10) SCC 141}, "the object of Order II, Rule 2, is two fold viz., (i) to ensure that no defendant is sued and vexed twice in regard to the same cause of action and (ii) to prevent a plaintiff from splitting of claims and remedies based on the same cause of action". The Supreme Court pointed out that Order II, Rule 2, does not bar a second suit based on a different and distinct cause of action. It was also pointed out in the same decision that the Court should see if the reliefs claimed in both the suits arose from the same cause of action. Applying the above principles, it could be seen clearly that the third contention of the defendant on the basis of Order II, Rule 2, CPC, is not well founded.
Om Prakash Srivastava vs Union Of India And Anr on 24 July, 2006
36. The following passage from Mohd. Khalil Khan case {AIR 1949 PC 78}, was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India {2006 (6) SCC 207}, as follows:-
Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. And ... vs Sudhir Bhatia And Ors. on 22 January, 2004
41. Once it is found (i) that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark (ii) that the plaintiff was the prior user of the trademark, far ahead in point of time than the use by the defendant (iii) that the defendant's attempt to get the same mark registered failed before the Registrar (iv) that at the time when an interim arrangement was reached by consent before the Division Bench, the defendant had only 4 outlets, but started 9 more outlets thereafter and (v) that the case is one of same marks and not similar marks, applied on the very same type of goods and services, an injunction should automatically follow. This is the mandate of the Apex Court in Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia [(2004) 3 SCC 90] in paragraph-5, held as follows:-