[P. Mahadevan Vs. M.D. T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6
SCC 636 (supra)]. Also further, it had been held it was not
reasonable that the department had taken more than twelve
years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding despite being aware of
the irregularities and that would be a case where there was an
unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
21. Regarding secondly, the principle whether such delay is likely
to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself -
the causes of possible prejudice to an officer towards defending
himself, although not listed exhaustively, had been indicatively
defined in a catena of cases by the superior Courts - some of
which were stated hereafter. It had been considered that if old
matters which have been settled by efflux of time were permitted
to be re-opened, then a retired officer may not be in a position to
defend himself because the evidence in his favour may not be
available or the co-employee might have settled at far, flung
places after retirement and memory may not serve such
witnesses and the retiree ; that the 'Sword of Damocles' in the
27 OA No.166/2021
shape of departmental inquiry cannot he kept hanging on the
head of the retiree for all times to come and he should be allowed
to live in peace [Baldhir Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.
(supra)]. Further, it had also been held that the delay of more
than 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings by issuance
of charge memo would render the departmental proceedings
vitiated and that in the absence of any explanation for the
inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings of issuance of
charge memo and proceeding further with the departmental
proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the
appellant.
18. Even though it has to be specifically looked into as to whether a
delay in the disciplinary proceeding has caused any prejudice to the
applicant, nonetheless as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of
Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal (supra).
Secondly, the learned counsel for the respondents had relied upon
the judgment and order dated 25.11.2020 of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the Civil Appeal No. 3820/2020 in the case of
Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Ors Vs.
Rajendra Kumar Dubey [2021 14 SCC 735], whereby the
evolution of the scope for interference with respect to disciplinary
proceedings had been traced through a catena of cases ; and the
principles of law eventually derived in the case of Union of India
Vs. P. Gunasekaran [(2015) 2 SCC 610] were inter-alia laid down
as follows:
Thirdly, the learned Counsel for the Respondents had further
relied upon a Judgment and Order dated 06.09.2021 of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in CA No. 5153/2021 in the case of State of
M.P. & Ors. Vs. Akhilesh Jha & Ors. [2021 12 SCC 460], inter-alia
citing the following :
This aspect has been dealt with by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police v. K.S.
Swaminathan 1997(1) SCT 373. It was held that if the charge memo is
totally vague and does not disclose any misconduct for which the
charges have been framed, the Tribunal or the Court would not be
justified at that stage to go into whether charges are true and could be
gone into. For it would be a matter on producing of the evidence for
consideration at the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer.