Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 11 (0.22 seconds)Juggi Lal-Kamalapat vs The Swadeshi Mills Company, Limited on 2 November, 1928
The plaintiff-respondent has used the word 'Eye' to combine with 'tex' which does not appear to be an independent word in itself and if it is so, it does not appear to convey any meaning. The word 'Eyetex' is the compound of the word 'Eye' with 'tex' as suffix. It is difficult, on principles as aforementioned to read in the two, that is, 'Eyetex' and 'Eyeris' such phonetic similarity as to lead to one infringing the other. We are supported in our view, with the judgment in wockhardt Limited's case, which in turn has placed reliance upon the judgment in M.M. Pharmaceuticals' case (Cited supra).
F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd vs Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd on 8 September, 1969
After referring to the judgments in Anglo French Drug Co. (Eastern) Ltd. v. M/s. Belco Pharms , F. Hoffimann-La-Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Put.
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs Dua Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. on 22 July, 1988
Ltd. , Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Dua Pharmacuticals Pvt. Ltd. , the Bench, in its judgment in the case of Whockhardt Ltd. has said, "the above authorities thus delineate the ambit of enquiry at the stage of grant of interlocutory injunction" and pronounced in a case of passing off as follows :
Parle Products (P) Ltd vs J. P. & Co. Mysore on 28 January, 1972
7. Before we refer to the facts of the instant case, we furnish for the consideration how the courts should decide whether to grant injunction or not a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Parle Products v. J.P. & Co. Mysore , which has been cited at the Bar by learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent.
Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma vs Navaratna Pharmaceutical ... on 20 October, 1964
The Supreme Court in the said judgment has refereed to its earlier judgment in the case of Durgs Dutt v. Nauratna Pharmaceutical Labouratortes , and pointed out, "the action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods (vide Section 21 of the Act). The use by the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an action for passing off, but is the sine qua non in the case of an action for infringement. In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant's mark is likely to deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's mark is so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and the court reaches the conclusion that their is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiff's rights are violated. Expressed in another way, if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark would be immaterial; whereas in the case of passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff." In Parle products case (cited Supra), the Supreme Court has said, "It is therefore clear that in order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered. They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other. It would be enough if the impugned mark bears such an overall similarity to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him. In this case we find that the packets are practically of the same size, the colour scheme of the two wrappers is almost the same; the design on both though not identical bears such a close resemblance that one can easily be mistaken for the other. The essential features of both are that there is a girl with one arm raised and carrying something in the other with a cow or cows near her and hens or chickens in the foreground. In the background there is a farm house with a fence. The words "Gluco Biscuits" in one and "Glucose Biscuits" on the other occupy a prominent place at the top with a good deal of similarity between the two writings. Anyone in our opinion who has a took at one the packets today may easily mistake the other if shown on another day as being the same article which he had seen before. If one was not careful enough to note peculiar features of the wrapper on the plaintiff's goods, he might easily mistake the defendant's wrapper for the plaintiffs' if shown to him some time after he had seen the plaintiffs'. After all an ordinary purchaser is not gifted with the powers of observation of a Sherlock Holmes. We have therefore no doubt that the defendants' wrapper is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' which has registered. We do not think it necessary to refer to the decisions referred to at the bar as in our view each case will have to be judged on its own features and it would be of no use to note on how many points there was similarity and in how many others there was absence of it."
Section 21 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Section 30 in The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Aravind Laboratories vs V.A. Samy Chemical Works on 8 July, 1986
6. The trail court has noted the case of the parties and Section 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Acts, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act') and the fact that the plaintiff-respondents have pleaded the invalidity of the registration of the defendant-appellant's mark and applied for rectification of the register and then said, "I find that the applicant had made out a prima facie case for injunction as well as for direction." Since we have not found any detailed consideration in the judgment how, for the purpose of injunction, the trial court has found that defendant-appellant's trade-mark has infringed the trade-mark rights of the plaintiff-respondent except the statement - "I perused the cartons of the plaintiff and that of the defendants. I am of the opinion that an ordinary purchaser of the plaintiff's goods will not be able to distinguish between the marks used by the defendants and that of the plaintiff. The fact that the defendants have also registered their marks is not a bar to this court to entertain the suit and give a temporary relief." We have heard learned counsel for the parties in details as to the various principles of law to be applied and, particularly, for the purpose of injunction, about the refrains in matters relating to trade marks. We had the opportunity to take notice of the common law practices in the courts before the 1940 Act as regards trade-mark violations for injunction, damages or accounts of profits in the case of Arvind Laboratories v. V. A. Samy Chemical Works (1994-1-174), in which we have considered judgments of the courts on the subjects such as Juggi Lal Kamalpat v. Swadeshi Mills Company Limited (AIR 1929 PC 11), and quoted from the judgment in the case of Gujarat G. and M. Co. v. Swadeshi Mills Company (AIR 1939 Bom 118), with approval the observation - "and injunction may be granted and nominal damages awarded merely on proof of infringement of a trade-mark and reasonable probability of damages to the plaintiff's trade and sub-stantial damages can only be awarded on proof of actual damages". A bench of this court, of which one of us (Mishra, J) was a member.