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1 - 10 of 17 (1.28 seconds)THE CONSTITUTION (FORTY-SECOND AMENDMENT) ACT, 1976
THE CONSTITUTION (FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1963
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union Of India And Others on 16 August, 1965
So also in Tara Chand Rhatri v. Municipal Corporation
of Delhi & Ors.. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 198 this Court observed
that there was a vital difference between an order of
reversal by the appellate authority and an order of
affirmance and the omission to give reasons for the decision
may not by itself be a sufficient ground for passing such
order, relying on the test laid down by Subba Rao, J. in
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd.. v. Union of India [1966] 1
S.C.R. 466.
Union Of India And Another vs Tulsiram Patel And Others on 11 July, 1985
More so, because the majority decision in Tulsiram
Patel's case seeks to justify the amendment effected by the
Forty-Second Amendment of cl. (2) of Art. 311 by observing
that 'cl. (2) of Art. 311 as originally enacted and the
legislative history of that clause wholly rule out the
giving of any opportunity'. We have our own reservations
about the correctness of this proposition. It is not quite
accurate to suggest that the opportunity of showing cause
before a Government servant was dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank was not contemplated by law nor justified by
the legislative history.
Union Of India vs I.M. Lal And Anr. on 20 January, 1972
After Parliament frustrated the attempt of the
Government to delete the constitutional safeguard as evolved
by this Court in Khem Chand's case following the principles
laid down in the Privy Council decision in I.M. Lall's case
by deletion of the words ' a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause
995
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him' by
the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, it seems
somewhat strange that after more than a decade the
Government of the day thought it fit to remove this valuable
safeguard by the Forty-Second Amendment. It is particularly
important to notice how closely Members of Parliament
scrutinised the motives of the Government while discussing
the Fifteenth Amendment Bill and it is profitable to read
the debates leading to the passsng of the Fifteenth
Amendment. m ere could scarcely be a better example of the
principle that the constituent powers to amend the
Constitution, however permissible, must be used with
scrupulous attention to their true purpose and for reasons
that are relevant and proper. A determined attempt on the
part of the Government to unsertle the law as laid down by
this Court was successfully frustrated on that occasion.
Although the clause as originally drafted in the Amendment
Bill was deficient insofar as it conferred no express
protection as regards the second stage i.e. the stage of
punishment, but the Fifteenth Amendment Act as passed,
introduced the requirement of giving a reasonable
opportunity on the penalty proposed, after the conclusion of
the inquiry into the charges and after a penalty had been
provisionally determined. After considerable debate in
Parliament, Shri Ashok Sen, Law Minister, intervened, in
deference to the concern expressed by Members representing
all sections of the House over the Amendment Bill by which
the Government was seeking to remove the opportunity at the
second stage, and gave an assurance that he would move an
amendment, making it clear that the second opportunity in
regard to the punishment proposed would be retained, but
such opportunity shall be only on the basis of the evidence
adduced during the inquiry. me Government accordingly moved
the following amendment :
Khem Chand vs The Union Of India And Others on 13 December, 1957
After Parliament frustrated the attempt of the
Government to delete the constitutional safeguard as evolved
by this Court in Khem Chand's case following the principles
laid down in the Privy Council decision in I.M. Lall's case
by deletion of the words ' a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause
995
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him' by
the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, it seems
somewhat strange that after more than a decade the
Government of the day thought it fit to remove this valuable
safeguard by the Forty-Second Amendment. It is particularly
important to notice how closely Members of Parliament
scrutinised the motives of the Government while discussing
the Fifteenth Amendment Bill and it is profitable to read
the debates leading to the passsng of the Fifteenth
Amendment. m ere could scarcely be a better example of the
principle that the constituent powers to amend the
Constitution, however permissible, must be used with
scrupulous attention to their true purpose and for reasons
that are relevant and proper. A determined attempt on the
part of the Government to unsertle the law as laid down by
this Court was successfully frustrated on that occasion.
Although the clause as originally drafted in the Amendment
Bill was deficient insofar as it conferred no express
protection as regards the second stage i.e. the stage of
punishment, but the Fifteenth Amendment Act as passed,
introduced the requirement of giving a reasonable
opportunity on the penalty proposed, after the conclusion of
the inquiry into the charges and after a penalty had been
provisionally determined. After considerable debate in
Parliament, Shri Ashok Sen, Law Minister, intervened, in
deference to the concern expressed by Members representing
all sections of the House over the Amendment Bill by which
the Government was seeking to remove the opportunity at the
second stage, and gave an assurance that he would move an
amendment, making it clear that the second opportunity in
regard to the punishment proposed would be retained, but
such opportunity shall be only on the basis of the evidence
adduced during the inquiry. me Government accordingly moved
the following amendment :
Satyavir Singh And Others vs Union Of India And Others Etc. Etc on 12 September, 1985
In Satyavir Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1985] 4 S.C.C. 252 there is an attempt made to analyse the
ratio of the majority decision in Tulsiram Patel's
998
case and the nature of the remedies left to the civil
servant at pp.276-281 of the report. If that be so, in a
case governed by one of the clauses of the second proviso to
Art. 311(2) or an analogous Service Rule, there is still all
the more reason that in cases not governed by the second
proviso, a civil servant subjected to disciplinary
punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank under
cl. (2) of Art. 311 would have these remedies left to him.
Virtually this is tantamount to a post-decisional hearing.
There has been considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion
in England as to whether a right of appeal is really a
substitute for the insistence upon the requirement of a fair
hearing or the observance of natural justice which implies
'the duty to act judicially'. Natural justice does not
require that there should be a right of appeal from any
decision. This is an inevitable corollary of the fact that
there is no right of appeal against a statutory authority
unless the statute so provides. Professor H.W.R.Wade in his
Administrative Law, 5th edn., at p. 487 observed :
Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs Union Of India on 13 January, 1981
In Swadeahi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, [1981]
2 S.C.R. 533 although the majority held that the rule of
audi alteram partem was not excluded from s.18A(1)(a) of the
Industrial Undertakings (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951, Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissented with the view and
expressed that the expression 'immediate action' may in
certain situations mean exclusion of the application of the
rules of natural justice and a post-decisional hearing
provided by the statute itself may be a sufficient
substitute. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into
the vexed question whether a post-decisional hearing is a
substitute of the denial of a right of hearing at the
initial stage or the observance of the rules of natural
justice since the majority in Tulsiram Patel's case
unequivocally lays down that the only stage at which a
Government servant gets 'a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him' i.e. an opportunity to exonerate himself from the
charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the inquiry
is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the
charge proved against him are not of such a character as to
merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or
reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments
ought to have been sufficient in his case, is at the stage
of hearing of a departmental appeal. Such being the legal
position, it is of utmost importance after the Forty-Second
Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's
case that the Appellate Authority must not only give a
hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a
reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in
the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned decisions by
tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the present case,
will promote public confidence in the administrative
process. An objective consideration is possible only if the
delinquent servant is heard and give a chance to satisfy the
Authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on
his appeal. Considerations of fairplay and justice also
require that such a personal hearing should be given.