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1 - 10 of 20 (0.72 seconds)New India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult on 10 October, 1975
In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975 (2)
SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not
be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into
a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a
liberal construction.
H.H. Brij Indar Singh vs Lala Kanshi Ram on 19 July, 1917
In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the
discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with
reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal.
Shakuntala Devi Jain vs Kuntal Kumari And Ors. on 5 September, 1968
In Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held
that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would
deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be
condoned.
Concord Of India Insurance Co Ltd vs Nirmala Devi And Ors on 16 April, 1979
In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979 (4)
SCC 365) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a
litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was
condoned.
Lala Mata Din vs A. Narayanan on 25 August, 1969
In Lala Matu Din v. A. Narayanan (1969 (2) SCC 770), this
Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of
counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely
a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that
the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not
tainted by any mala fide motive.
Milvi Devi vs Dina Nath on 11 January, 1982
In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982 (3) SCC 366),
it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136
can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order
made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing
on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case
was remitted for decision on merits.
O.P. Kathpalia vs Lakhmir Singh (Dead) And Ors. on 23 July, 1984
In O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (1984 (4) SCC 66), a Bench
of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay
results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to
condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned.
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & ... vs Mst. Katiji & Ors on 19 February, 1987
In Collector Land
Acquisition v. Katiji (1987 (2) SCC 107), a Bench of two Judges
considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the
State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court
to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on
merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to
enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that
this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have
percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court
reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained"
G. Ramegowda, Major, Etc vs Special Land Acquisition Officer, ... on 10 March, 1988
In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988
(2) SCC 142), it was held that no general principle saving the party
from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression
"sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are
required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to
the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which
Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such
defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are
collective and institutional decisions and do not share the
characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of
limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for
governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat
different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes
out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and
where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was,
therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to
exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of
the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered,
as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore,
not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints".