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1 - 10 of 13 (0.70 seconds)K.S. Bonnerji vs Sitanath Das on 1 November, 1921
5. The first decision is the decision of the Privy Council in K. S. Bannmerji v. Sitanath Das, AIR 1922 PC 209. This was a case where a lease granted by a power-of-attorney holder of a trustee was challenged. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the lease was execution by a person without authority and was, therefore, void. Lord Buckmaster, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, gave the following reason for taking this view:--
Ishwardas vs Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal & Ors on 13 March, 1968
10. There was, however, one decision cited on the behalf of the landlord to which we must refer before we part with this question. That was the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishwardas v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, AIR 1968 SC 1364. This case arose out of an application made by the managing trustee of a public charitable trust for possession of a certain portion of the land leased out to a tenant, under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958. The ground on which possession was sought was that the managing trustee bona fide required the land for cultivation it personally. Section 2(12) defined the expression "to cultivate personally" to mean to cultivate on one's own account. The tenant resisted the application on a two fold ground. One ground was that the managing trustee was not a landlord entitled to obtain possession of the land since the land was not vested in him and the other was that the meaning trustee could cultivate the land only on account of the beneficiaries and not on his own account and it could not, therefore, be said that he bona fide required the land for cultivating it personally. Both these grounds were negatived by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that in view of Section 2(18) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, the properties of the trust which included the land in question vested in the managing trustee was, therefore, a landlord within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act and since the land vested in the managing trustee cultivation by him in the manner set out in Section 2(12) could be considered to be cultivation "on one's own account" and the managing trustee, was therefore, entitled to obtain possession of the land form the tenant. We fail to see how this decision can be of any assistance to the plaintiff so far as the present contention is concerned. It is apparent from the decision that no contention was advanced before the Supreme Court that the managing trustee alone was not entitled to maintain the application for obtaining possession of the land from the tenant and that the other trustees were necessary parties to the application. It is quite possible that such a contention was not advanced because under the instrument of trust the managing trustee was empowered to maintain suits and applications on behalf of the trust without joining other co-trustees. But, whatever be the reason, it is clear that no question as to the competency of the managing trustee alone to maintain the application was raised before the Supreme Court nor did the Supreme Court have occasion to consider any such question and the decision of the Supreme Court cannot, therefore, be regarded as an authority on the point that a managing trustee can maintain an action on behalf of the trust without joining the other trustees.