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1 - 10 of 27 (0.32 seconds)Section 18 in The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [Entire Act]
Section 10 in The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [Entire Act]
Section 99 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 13 in The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [Entire Act]
Institute Of Chartered Accountants vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986
This principle has been echoed by
our Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India V. L K
Ratna and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 537 and also in Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. V.
Union of India (2010) 13 SCC 427. This rule however has no application
on the facts of the present case. We have already seen that full
opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioners by the BIFR
W.P.(C) Nos.5010, 10169, 5971 of 2011, 5954/2011 & C.M.No.12050/2011,
W.P.(C) No.5197/2011 & CMs.No.10541/2011, 219/2012, 3077/2012 Page 51 of 52
itself as shown by us hereinabove. At no stage of the proceedings were
the petitioners denied any opportunity nor was it their case that they were
not afforded any opportunity of being heard by the BIFR. Their only
grievance right through i.e. before the AIFR for the first time and
thereafter before this Court, is that the hearing was given by one Bench,
but the decision was taken by another.
Rasid Javed & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Anr on 5 July, 2010
The judgment
of the Supreme Court in Rasid Javed and Ors. V. State of UP and Anr,
(supra) cited on behalf of the petitioners, reiterates the principle of
Gullapalli (supra) and this judgment is therefore of no assistance in the
W.P.(C) Nos.5010, 10169, 5971 of 2011, 5954/2011 & C.M.No.12050/2011,
W.P.(C) No.5197/2011 & CMs.No.10541/2011, 219/2012, 3077/2012 Page 46 of 52
present case.
Kiran Singh And Others vs Chaman Paswan And Others on 14 April, 1954
In any
case we are unable to demur to the proposition that the principles behind
the provisions of the CPC can be properly invoked in the absence of any
specific provision in the SICA to cover the situation. The argument of
Mr. Rajiv Nayar, however, was that this can be permitted only in the case
of death or transfer of the Members of the BIFR and not otherwise. But if
it is the prerogative of the Chairman to constitute the Benches and such
W.P.(C) Nos.5010, 10169, 5971 of 2011, 5954/2011 & C.M.No.12050/2011,
W.P.(C) No.5197/2011 & CMs.No.10541/2011, 219/2012, 3077/2012 Page 41 of 52
prerogative was not questioned by the petitioners, there is no reason why
the principle behind Order XVIII, Rule 15 of the CPC should not be
invoked and applied. Mr. Vikas Singh in this behalf has rightly drawn
our attention to the observation of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and
Ors. vs. Chaman Paswan and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 340 where it was
observed that the policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the CPC is that
when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment
rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical
grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice or there has been a
prejudice on merits. Section 99 of the CPC, which embodies this
principle is partly reflected in Section 10 of the SICA which, inter alia,
says that no act or proceeding of the Board shall be questioned on the
ground merely of the existence of any defect in the constitution of the
Board. Regulation 16(3) also states that subject to the other provisions of
the Regulations, "every order made or act done by a Bench in exercise of
its powers shall be deemed to be the order or act, as the case may be, of
the Board".
Pilli Nageswara Rao And Others vs Vice-Chairman And Managing Director, ... on 24 November, 1998
46. We may now briefly refer to the authorities cited before us. The
judgment of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. V.
APSRTC and Anr. (supra) cited by the petitioners, is a case which arose
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That Act and the rules framed
thereunder imposed a duty on the State Government to give a personal
hearing. The Rules provided that it was the duty of the Secretary of the
Transport Department of the State to hear and the Transport Minister to
decide. By a majority of 3 : 2, the Supreme Court held that such a
procedure defeats the object of personal hearing and such divided
responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. It was held
that personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the
demeanour of the witnesses and clear his doubts during the arguments
and the party appearing is enabled to persuade the authority to accept his
point of view by a reasoned argument. It was held that if one person
hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty
formality. This case which arose under the administrative law does not
have any application to the case before us. There is no divided
responsibility in the present case which can be said to be destructive of
the concept of judicial hearing. Herein there are no two authorities - one
to hear and another to decide. The authority which hears and decides is
W.P.(C) Nos.5010, 10169, 5971 of 2011, 5954/2011 & C.M.No.12050/2011,
W.P.(C) No.5197/2011 & CMs.No.10541/2011, 219/2012, 3077/2012 Page 45 of 52
the same, namely the BIFR. The BIFR acts through its Benches and we
have already seen that as per regulation 16(3), every order made or act
done by a Bench in exercise of its powers shall be deemed to be the order
or act as the case may be, of the Board. Regulation 3(b) defines "Board"
to mean the BIFR and includes, where the context so requires, a Bench
exercising the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Board. Keeping
these regulations in view, it is difficult to accept the proposition that the
earlier Bench consisting of the Chairman and two Members and the later
Bench consisting of the Chairman and V K Malhotra were different
authorities entrusted with a divided responsibility which could destroy the
concept of judicial hearing. It is the very same authority, namely the
BIFR, which hears and decides through its Benches and such Benches
could be differently constituted at different times. The position may
however be different if a proceeding is marked as "part-heard", in which
case it is that Bench alone, unless otherwise directed by the Chairman for
valid reasons, that can continue to hear the proceedings. The decision is
therefore of no help to the petitioners in the present case.
Automotive Tyre Manufactureres Assn vs The Designated Authority & Ors on 7 January, 2011
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Automotive
Tyre Manufacturers Association V. Designated Authority and Ors.,
(2011) 2 SCC 258 on which also reliance was placed on behalf of the
petitioners lays emphasis on personal hearing, if the statute does not
exclude the same. The Supreme Court held that if there is no such
exclusion, the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard would be generally read into the provisions of the statute. This
judgment takes care of the submission of Mr Vaidyanathan that Section
18 of the SICA does not contemplate any hearing. We have already held
that having regard to the object and purpose of Section 18(3)(b), it is
necessary for the BIFR to give parties a reasonable opportunity of being
heard. This judgment is not of relevance to the present case since in the
case before the Supreme Court, admittedly the entire material had been
collected by the predecessor - DA, who had allowed the interested parties
and their representatives to present the relevant information before him in
terms of the applicable rule, but the final findings in the form of an order
were recorded by the successor - DA who had no occasion to hear the
appellants before the Supreme Court. It was in these circumstances held
that the final order passed by the successor-DA offended the basic
principle of natural justice. It would be apparent from the aforesaid
W.P.(C) Nos.5010, 10169, 5971 of 2011, 5954/2011 & C.M.No.12050/2011,
W.P.(C) No.5197/2011 & CMs.No.10541/2011, 219/2012, 3077/2012 Page 47 of 52
narration that the present case stands on a different footing on facts.
Whereas in the case before the Supreme Court, the predecessor-DA had
collected all the relevant material and information from the parties and
the successor-DA merely passed orders without collecting any further
information or material and without giving a hearing to the parties, in the
present case not only did the Bench which heard the matter on and from
24.11.2009 collected further material by issuing appropriate directions to
the parties and the OA, but also applied its mind to the material so
collected and also to the material already brought on record by the earlier
Bench and after giving several opportunities to the parties on 30.11.2009,
2.12.2009 and 7.12.2009, proceeded to pronounce the final decision on
9.12.2009. The present case is therefore completely distinct on facts from
those before the Supreme Court in the judgment cited above. Therefore,
the said judgment has no application.