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1 - 10 of 12 (0.29 seconds)Section 21 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 36 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Section 41 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
M/S. Sant Ram & Company vs The State Of Rajasthan & Ors on 20 November, 1996
Section 9 is essentially based on Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model. Analogous provision under the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act is Section 41(b) read with Second Schedule to the said Act. But, the powers of the court under the 1996 Act are wider. Under the 1940 Act, pendency of the court proceedings was a condition precedent for exercise of power (See: Sant Ram and Company v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 2557). Section 9 is an independent power and pendency of a court proceeding was not necessary to attract jurisdiction under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Being an independent statutory power, by agreement between the parties, power of the court cannot be restricted; but, under Section 17, power of the arbitrator to take interim measure of protection can be restricted by agreement between the parties as Section 17 begins with the words "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties". Courts have no power to adjudicate on merits of the case in the guise of passing orders under Section 9. The list of interim measures or protection given in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 9(ii) is not exhaustive. Clause (e) indicates that other interim measures for protection also can be granted by the court at its discretion, if it appears to the court just and convenient. Therefore, power under Section 9 is wider than Section 44(3) of the old Act and power of the arbitrator under Section 17 of the 1996 Act. Power of the court under Section 9 is a statutory power and not emanating from the arbitration agreement.
Section 44 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Sundaram Finance Ltd vs Nepc India Ltd on 13 January, 1999
5. The first question to be considered is whether Section 9 can be invoked as arbitration proceedings were not started in this case. It was held by the Apex Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC Ltd. (AIR 1999 SC 565) that an interim order under Section 9 can be passed even before the commencement of arbitration proceedings. If it is after receipt of notice under Section 21 of the Act provided there is an agreement for arbitration. Apex Court held as follows:
T. Krishnaswamy Chetty vs C. Thangavelu Chetty And Ors. on 6 December, 1954
"22. The court has the discretion to appoint a receiver where it is just and convenient to do so. The court must exercise its discretion reasonably and objectively by taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the need to meet the ends of justice by preserving the property and protecting the rights of all the parties. A receiver will not be appointed at the instance of a person until the court is satisfied that prima facie he has a strong case and an excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. The court will be slow to deprive a person of his de facto possession unless it is satisfied that the property is exposed to danger and loss and the person in possession has obtained it through fraud or force. The high prerogative act of taking property out of the hands of one and putting it in pound under the order of the Judge ought not to be taken except to prevent manifest wrong imminently impending": Crawford v. Rose (39Ga44) (quoted in Krishnaswamy v. Thangavelu (AIR 1955 Mad. 430, 435)). The conduct of the party seeking the appointment of the Receiver is a relevant consideration in the exercise of this discretion. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands.