Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 26 (0.55 seconds)Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 134 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
State Of C.G vs Toman @ Doman Singh Thakur 36 ... on 18 June, 2018
2. The instant criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellants, namely, Shiv Dayal Sharma and Ravi Pratap Sharma challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 22.10.2001 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge (E.C. Act), Lucknow in Sessions Trial No. 840 of 1997 (State vs. Shiv Dayal Sharma and others), arising out of Case Crime No.181 of 1997, under Sections 302/34 I.P.C., Police Station Bazar Khala, Lucknow, whereby the appellants were convicted under Section 302/34 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of which, they were required to undergo simple imprisonment for three years.
Jagdish Prasad And Others vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 March, 1992
29. Vadivelu Thevar case (supra) was referred to with approval in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. (AIR 1994 SC 1251). It was held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'). But, if there are doubts and suspicion about the testimony of such a witness the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality which is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth around it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.
Lallu Manjhi & Anr vs State Of Jharkhand on 7 January, 2003
In Lallu Manjhi vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2003 SC 854 Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Para 10, that "The Law of Evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the Court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon testimony of a single witness."
Sucha Singh And Anr vs State Of Punjab on 31 July, 2003
In AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 3617, Sucha singh v/s State of Punjab Hon'ble Apex Court after considering Masalti and others vs. State of U.P. (MANU/SC/0074/1964), State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76), opined as under:- "Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that, it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'.
State Of Punjab vs Jagir Singh And Ors on 6 August, 1973
In AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 3617, Sucha singh v/s State of Punjab Hon'ble Apex Court after considering Masalti and others vs. State of U.P. (MANU/SC/0074/1964), State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76), opined as under:- "Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that, it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'.
Nasar Ali vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 14 February, 1957
(See Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 366). Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh and another v. (AIR 1956 SC 460). The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.