Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 5 of 5 (0.73 seconds)Mittal Investment Corporation vs Additional Commissioner Of Commercial ... on 24 September, 1999
In this view of the matter, the Judgment of the High Court to the
extent that it confirms with the above-mentioned view stands
confirmed. We do not approve the observations in Mittal Investment
Corporation's case (supra) which are contrary to the view expressed
above. As on the main aspects we agree with the High Court
Judgment, we see no reason to interfere.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax Bombay Etc vs Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. Etc on 27 May, 1997
In support of this submission, he relied upon
the Judgments of this Court in the cases of C.I.T. vs. Podar Cement
Ltd. reported in (1992) 5 SCC 482 and Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. C.I.T.
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 106. In these cases, in the context of the
Income Tax Act, it has been held that even though there is no formal
conveyance the concerned party could be considered to be the
beneficial owner. Mr. Mehta submitted that an owner cannot be said
to carrying on a works contract on behalf of others.
Mr. Mehta next submitted that in any event the Appellants did
not undertake any works contract for and on behalf of the intended
purchasers. He submitted that the Appellants were themselves
developing the property and selling flats or commercial complexes in
that property. He submitted that in such type of activities no works
contract was involved. Mr. Mehta submitted that in the Agreements
with the intended purchasers there was a clause which provides that if
all payments are not made then amounts paid can be forfeited and the
agreement rescinded. He submitted that a person carrying out a
works contract would have no right to forfeit or rescind the contract
itself. He submitted that such a clause indicates that the Agreements
are not agreements to carry out a works contract.
On the other hand, Mr. Hegde submitted that the definition of a
`works contract' in the said Act is an inclusive definition which is very
wide. He submitted that any agreement wherein party has agreed to
construct or build for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration would be covered by the definition of the term `works
contract' as used in the said Act. In support of his submission he
relied upon the Agreements entered into by the Appellants with the
various purchasers and submitted that these Agreements indicate that
the Appellants are undertaking the construction of the building and the
flats for and on behalf of the purchasers and that the same is for
valuable consideration to be paid in a differed manner. He submitted
that except to the extent that the Appellants retain certain commercial
premises or flats for themselves, the work carried out pursuant to such
Agreements would amount to a `works contract'. He submitted that
the Appellants are liable to pay turnover tax on the transfer of
property in goods involved in such works contract.
We have heard the parties, perused the various documents and
considered the cases cited at the bar. As has been rightly submitted
by Mr. Hegde the definition of the term `works contract' in the said Act
is an inclusive definition. It does not include merely a works contract
as normally understood. It is a wide definition which includes "any
agreement" for carrying out building or construction activity for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The definition does
not make a distinction based on who carries on the construction
activity. Thus even an owner of the property may also be said to be
carrying on a works contract if he enters into an agreement to
construct for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
We, therefore, do not need to go into the question whether the
Appellants are owners as even if the Appellants are owners to the
extent that they have entered into Agreements to carry out
construction activity on behalf of somebody else for cash, deferred
payment or other valuable consideration, they would be carrying out a
works contract and would become liable to pay turnover tax on the
transfer of property in the goods involved in such works contract.
Further under the said Act there is no distinction between construction
of residential flats or commercial units. Thus, a works contract, within
the meaning of the term in the said Act, can also be for construction of
commercial units. For the purposes of considering whether an
agreement amounts to a works contract or not, the provisions of the
Karnataka Ownership Flats (Regulation of Promotion of Construction,
Sales, Management and Transfer) Act, 1974 will have no relevance.
However as Mr. Mehta has argued on this aspect we record that
reliance of the Judgments in Podar Cement Ltd. and Mysore Minerals
Ltd. cases (supra) are of no assistance to the Appellants. Those are
cases under the Income Tax Act. Those cases lay down that the term
`owner' must be given an interpretation in the context of the
provisions of the Act. If that rational was to be applied then in the
context of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, the Appellants would not be
owners as admittedly they do not have any registered sale-deeds in
their hand. The Agreement relied upon by Mr. Mehta between the
Appellants and the owners of the land is nothing but a development
Agreement. Pursuant to such an Agreement, plan would be get
sanctioned in the name of the owner of the property. It would be the
owner of the property who would then execute a conveyance directly
to the society of purchasers. All that the Appellants have is a
possessary interest and a right to construct. Such rights do not
constitute the person an owner of the property.
To consider whether the Appellants are executing works contract
one needs to look at a typical Agreement entered into with the
purchaser. The relevant clauses are clause (q), (r) of the recitals and
clauses 1, 5(c) and 7, which read as follows:
Mysore Minerals Ltd., M.G. Road, ... vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Karnataka, ... on 1 September, 1999
In support of this submission, he relied upon
the Judgments of this Court in the cases of C.I.T. vs. Podar Cement
Ltd. reported in (1992) 5 SCC 482 and Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. C.I.T.
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 106. In these cases, in the context of the
Income Tax Act, it has been held that even though there is no formal
conveyance the concerned party could be considered to be the
beneficial owner. Mr. Mehta submitted that an owner cannot be said
to carrying on a works contract on behalf of others.
Mr. Mehta next submitted that in any event the Appellants did
not undertake any works contract for and on behalf of the intended
purchasers. He submitted that the Appellants were themselves
developing the property and selling flats or commercial complexes in
that property. He submitted that in such type of activities no works
contract was involved. Mr. Mehta submitted that in the Agreements
with the intended purchasers there was a clause which provides that if
all payments are not made then amounts paid can be forfeited and the
agreement rescinded. He submitted that a person carrying out a
works contract would have no right to forfeit or rescind the contract
itself. He submitted that such a clause indicates that the Agreements
are not agreements to carry out a works contract.
On the other hand, Mr. Hegde submitted that the definition of a
`works contract' in the said Act is an inclusive definition which is very
wide. He submitted that any agreement wherein party has agreed to
construct or build for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration would be covered by the definition of the term `works
contract' as used in the said Act. In support of his submission he
relied upon the Agreements entered into by the Appellants with the
various purchasers and submitted that these Agreements indicate that
the Appellants are undertaking the construction of the building and the
flats for and on behalf of the purchasers and that the same is for
valuable consideration to be paid in a differed manner. He submitted
that except to the extent that the Appellants retain certain commercial
premises or flats for themselves, the work carried out pursuant to such
Agreements would amount to a `works contract'. He submitted that
the Appellants are liable to pay turnover tax on the transfer of
property in goods involved in such works contract.
We have heard the parties, perused the various documents and
considered the cases cited at the bar. As has been rightly submitted
by Mr. Hegde the definition of the term `works contract' in the said Act
is an inclusive definition. It does not include merely a works contract
as normally understood. It is a wide definition which includes "any
agreement" for carrying out building or construction activity for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The definition does
not make a distinction based on who carries on the construction
activity. Thus even an owner of the property may also be said to be
carrying on a works contract if he enters into an agreement to
construct for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
We, therefore, do not need to go into the question whether the
Appellants are owners as even if the Appellants are owners to the
extent that they have entered into Agreements to carry out
construction activity on behalf of somebody else for cash, deferred
payment or other valuable consideration, they would be carrying out a
works contract and would become liable to pay turnover tax on the
transfer of property in the goods involved in such works contract.
Further under the said Act there is no distinction between construction
of residential flats or commercial units. Thus, a works contract, within
the meaning of the term in the said Act, can also be for construction of
commercial units. For the purposes of considering whether an
agreement amounts to a works contract or not, the provisions of the
Karnataka Ownership Flats (Regulation of Promotion of Construction,
Sales, Management and Transfer) Act, 1974 will have no relevance.
However as Mr. Mehta has argued on this aspect we record that
reliance of the Judgments in Podar Cement Ltd. and Mysore Minerals
Ltd. cases (supra) are of no assistance to the Appellants. Those are
cases under the Income Tax Act. Those cases lay down that the term
`owner' must be given an interpretation in the context of the
provisions of the Act. If that rational was to be applied then in the
context of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, the Appellants would not be
owners as admittedly they do not have any registered sale-deeds in
their hand. The Agreement relied upon by Mr. Mehta between the
Appellants and the owners of the land is nothing but a development
Agreement. Pursuant to such an Agreement, plan would be get
sanctioned in the name of the owner of the property. It would be the
owner of the property who would then execute a conveyance directly
to the society of purchasers. All that the Appellants have is a
possessary interest and a right to construct. Such rights do not
constitute the person an owner of the property.
To consider whether the Appellants are executing works contract
one needs to look at a typical Agreement entered into with the
purchaser. The relevant clauses are clause (q), (r) of the recitals and
clauses 1, 5(c) and 7, which read as follows:
Section 53A in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
1