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1 - 5 of 5 (0.19 seconds)Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Sohan Lal (Dead)By Lrs on 29 November, 1999
In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal , this Court, in para 10, has stated thus:
Roop Singh (Dead) Through Lrs vs Ram Singh (Dead) Through Lrs on 28 March, 2000
8. Yet again, in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh , this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
Thakur Kishan Singh vs Arvind Kumar on 7 September, 1994
"7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-findings courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar ). Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below."
Bhagwandas Fatechanci Daswani & Ors vs Hpa International And Ors on 13 January, 2000
9. In the light of what is stated above, in our view, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. Further, as stated above, the arguments were heard in November, 1990 and the High Court pronounced the judgments on 7th May, 1993. This Court in Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani and Ors. v. HPA International and Ors. , dealing with the contention that the long delay in delivery of judgment is sufficient to set aside the judgment under appeal without going into this broad question, set aside the judgment under appeal on the ground of delay in delivery of judgment without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and remitted the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits. While doing so this Court observed, "However, it is correct to this extent that a long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the minds of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the Bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment - nearly after five years..... We, therefore, on this short question, set aside the judgment under appeal." In this view also the judgment of the High Court under challenge cannot be sustained.
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