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1 - 4 of 4 (0.52 seconds)Manick Lal Singh vs Gouri Shankar Shah on 23 May, 1967
The leaned Counsel has relied upon two decisions of the
Division Bench of our Court, namely, (i) in the matter of Manick
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Lal Singh vs. Gouri Shankar Shah, reported in 1968 0 AIR(Cal)
245 and (ii) in the case of Sunil Kumar Mukhopadhyay vs.
Provash Chandra Majumdar reported in 1969 0 AIR(Cal) 88 and
impressed upon this Court that the land appurtenant to the
dwelling house should also be construed as part of the dwelling
house within the scope and meaning of Section 4 of the Partition
Act.
Sunil Kumar Mukhopadhaya And Anr. vs Provash Chandra Majumdar And Ors. on 19 May, 1967
The leaned Counsel has relied upon two decisions of the
Division Bench of our Court, namely, (i) in the matter of Manick
4
Lal Singh vs. Gouri Shankar Shah, reported in 1968 0 AIR(Cal)
245 and (ii) in the case of Sunil Kumar Mukhopadhyay vs.
Provash Chandra Majumdar reported in 1969 0 AIR(Cal) 88 and
impressed upon this Court that the land appurtenant to the
dwelling house should also be construed as part of the dwelling
house within the scope and meaning of Section 4 of the Partition
Act.
Gautam Paul vs Debi Rani Paul And Ors on 17 October, 2000
The evidence on record would show that the defendant is
possessing a part of the suit property. This has been admitted by
PW-2 during the cross-examination. It also transpired during the
trial that the stranger/purchaser has purchased not the dwelling
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house but a vacant land adjoining to the road which is clear from
the two sale deeds being Exhibit-A and Exhibit-B.
The learned Trial Judge has relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Goutam Paul vs. Debi
Rani Paul, reported in 2001 WBLR Supreme Court page 135,
where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly stated that when a
share of dwelling house where the family resides is transferred to
stranger/purchaser, the principle of Section 4 is applied in a case
where it does not relate to the share in a dwelling house, the
provision of the said Act would not apply. In fact, the judgment
cited by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
while acknowledging that 'dwelling house' may have an extensive
meaning but it has to be assessed contextually. There has to be an
evidence to show that the vacant land was necessary for the
convenient occupation of the dwelling house. Admittedly, there is
no evidence on record to show that the appellant adduced any
evidence - oral or documentary - to show that the vacant land
purchased by the stranger/purchaser was necessary for the
convenient occupation of the house, which is claimed to be a
dwelling house.
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