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1 - 10 of 16 (0.33 seconds)Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 28 January, 2009
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
Durga Prashad vs Chief Controller Of Imports & Exports & ... on 22 November, 1968
"8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with
the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769). Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
Moon Mills Ltd vs Industrial Court Bombay (M.R. Meher) & ... on 28 February, 1967
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969
Supreme Court 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
S. Gopinath, K. Veeraraghavan, L. ... vs Union Of India (Uoi), Rep. By The General ... on 26 February, 2002
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation
with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union
of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no relief can
be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself
a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors vs Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors on 24 October, 1986
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
Ram Kumar (Advocate) vs State Of Haryana And Others on 22 September, 2008
In the said judgment, it has been held as under:-
New Delhi Municipal Council vs Pan Singh & Ors on 8 March, 2007
"10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278, observed:
Government Of West Bengal vs Tarun K. Roy And Ors on 18 November, 2003
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
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CWP-8387 of 2026 8
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]"