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1 - 10 of 27 (0.26 seconds)Section 364 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 201 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 26 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Pulukuri Kottaya vs King-Emperor on 19 December, 1946
The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the 'fact discovered' envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect."
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Pandurang Kalu Patil And Anr vs State Of Maharashtra on 17 January, 2002
In the latest decision in Pandurang Kalu Patel v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 1 (JT) SC 220: AIR 2002 AC 733 it was held that the object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit a certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police officer admissible in evidence whether or not. such statement is confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless, the ban against admissibility would stand lifted if the statement distinctly related to a discovery of fact. The fact can be discovered by the investigating officer pursuant to an information elicited from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one such cause. Recovery or even production of object by itself need not necessarily result in discovery of fact. Discovery of a fact cannot be equated with recovery of the object though the latter may help in the final shape of what exactly was the fact discovered pursuant to the information elicited from the accused.
State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Jeet Singh on 15 March, 1999
60. Lastly the evidence of recovery was assailed on the ground that as per the prosecution evidence the two portions of dead body of Nirvikar were recovered from mango grove of Haji Farooq which was opened and accessible to others. Simply for the reason that the places from where recoveries were made situated in a mango grove belonging to another person that by itself would not take the evidence of recovery out of the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. in this connection we may refer to the Apex Court decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh (1999) 4 SCC 370:AIR 1999 SC 1293 wherein it was held that there is nothing under Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is open or accessible to others. It is a fallacious notion that whenever recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried in the main road-side or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred, its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence, the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others, if it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others. The two portions of the dead body were so concealed under the earth that they were not visible to others. The accused himself removed the earth with the help of spade and took them out. Therefore, the mere fact that the mango grove belonged to another person would not take the evidence of recovery out of the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We, therefore, reject this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant also. Recovery of towel type handkerchief of the deceased, blood stained string of cot and empty pouches of country-made liquor in pursuance of the disclosure statement made by the appellant:
Santa Singh vs State Of Punjab on 17 August, 1976
In the case Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Apex Court has clearly laid down that hearing as contemplated in Section 235(2), Cr.P.C. is not confined merely to hearing of oral submissions, but would extend to giving and materials relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence. After an order of conviction is recorded the accused has to be specifically apprised of this right and given an opportunity to place before the Court all relevant material relating to mitigating circumstances, if any.