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1 - 10 of 10 (0.21 seconds)Jaipal Singh Rana vs Swaraj Pal Singh And Anr. on 22 February, 2008
iii)Jaipal Singh Rana Vs Swaraj Pal Singh and
Anr. 2010 (1) DCR 636, in this case it has
also been observed that:
"20.
Lillykutty vs Lawrance on 29 August, 2003
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in
Lillykutty v. Lawrance 2003 (2) DCR 610 relying on
earlier judgment of the Division Bench in Gangadhar
explained the law thus:
Narayanan Gangadhara Panicker vs T.R. Haridasan on 6 October, 1989
Burden is on here to show that the two cheques
were taken away from her business premises. Apart
from the intested testimony of the defendant there is
no other independent evidence adduced to establish
the story that cheques were stolen from her
business premises. Defendant has not cared to
examine any of the employees of the establishment.
Counsel appearing for the defendant placed
considerable reliance on the decision of this Court in
Gandgadhara Panicker v. Haridasan 1989)2) KLT
730 and the contended that the presumption under
Section 118 of the Act would arise only when there
is a negotiable instrument which is admitted to have
been executed. It is pointed out that when the fact of
execution of the cheque itself is in dispute plaintiff
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has to prove also passing of consideration. In other
words, only when due exe cution has been
established presumption under Section 118 (a) can
be raised.
M.G. Gurubasappa vs Rudriah on 23 November, 1967
Reference was also made to the decision
of the Mysore High Court in Gurubasappa v.
Rudriah AIR 1969 Mys. 269. We are of the view, in a
given case cheque is issued by the drawer in favor
of the payee and the same is dishonoured by the
drawer's Bank stating "funds insufficient", holder of
the cheque is entitled to get the amount as reflected
in the cheque since the cheque is a negotiable
instrument as per Section 118. We are of the view
under Section 118 of the Act until the contrary is
proved presumption can be made that every
negotiable instrument was made for consideration.
The expression "until the contrary is proved" is
relevant under Section 118 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act. When the drawer of the cheque did
not find any infirmity in the cheque presented by the
payee presumption raised under Section 118 would
apply unless the contrary is proved by the drawer of
the cheque. Therefore mere fact that the payee's
name and the amount shown in the cheque Is not in
the handwriting of the drawer of the cheque that by
itself is not a ground to contend that they are not
validly issued or the cheques were not executed at
all.
Article 227 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 87 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Ram Lal Hans & Sons vs Union Of India on 16 October, 2001
ii) Ram Lal Hans & Sons Vs Union of India
2002 II AD (Delhi) 473; in this case it has also
been observed that:
".....the Union of India was served on 20th
September, 1996 and application had been filed
after an year seeking condensation of delay. In that
view of the matter the Union of India necessarily had
to show as to what prevented it from filing the
objections within time. The application by itself is
delightfully vague. It simply states that delay
occurred due to seeking legal opinion from various
departments. The normal principle of law is that a
party seeking condensation of delay must explain
each days delay. Herein what to talk of each days
delay, the delay of months is not at all being
explained. Stating that there was delay in various
departments would not improve the version of the
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objector. It is not known as to which department
delayed and why and how the delay occurred.
Consequently there is no hesitation in concluding
that there is no specific averment as to why delay
has occurred. Merely because it happens to be the
Union of India/State necessarily does not imply that
period of limitation will have no say in the matter or
they can approach the court at any time. Delay
occurs because of the vast administrative expense
of the State but still it must be explained as to how
the delay has occurred. It is not done. Therefore,
there is no ground to condone the delay and as a
necessary corollary the objections filed along with
the application seeking condensation of delay fails
and are dismissed."
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
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