32 in Govinda Menon v. Kombunni Mannadiar C.M.S.A. No. 99 of 1915 (unreported) and in Abdul Kadir v. Samipandia Tevar (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 835, whether a mortgagor who obtained a decree for redemption can apply for sale when no final decree is passed under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, which enables the mortgagee only to apply for the passing of a final decree, does, not arise, though I may add that, if it arises, I am inclined to follow those decisions and do not share the doubts expressed by Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in the last of them.
285, Abdul Kader Rowther v. Krishnan Malavai Nair (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 695 though in many cases it amounts to the same thing, may in some cases (such as this) turn out to be fallacious.
8. But it has also been pointed out in Nani Nair v. Kandan Ashtamoorthi Nambudripad (1918) M.W.N. 551. p. 553 that
Provisions like directions for sale in default, allowing time to pay moneys declared as due and so on, not inconsistent with the Improvements Act and directed or allowed by the new Civil Procedure Code to be mentioned in a decree for redemption or ejectment can, of course, be mentioned in decrees passed in suits falling under the Compensation Act also
11. On the second ground also, I am unable to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge. Ordinarily, it is the judgment-debtors that have to pay or do some act under decrees in order to avoid sale, and applications by them for extension of time retard execution and do not aid it. But it does not follow that, in redemption decrees and similar decrees, where the decree-holder has to pay before obtaining execution and asks for extension of the time allowed to him for payment, such application does not aid him though it may retard execution of the decree. It aids Mm in the execution of the portion of the decree relating to redemption which he cannot get without extension of the time: see Pitam Singh v. Tota Singh (1907) I.L.R. 29. All. 301. at p. 302. As my learned brother observed in the course of the argument, late redemption is better than No. redemption. It may be that those applications do not aid the particular kind of execution now sought, viz., sale which was a relief granted as an alternative to the relief of redemption.