Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 20 (0.22 seconds)
N.Suresh vs The Commandant, Central Industrial ... on 18 September, 2012 cites

Navinchandra N. Majithia vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 4 September, 2000

Osborne's Concise Law Dictionary defines "cause of action" as the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right of action. Black's Law Dictionary defines the expression "cause of action" to mean the fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a cause of action is stated to be the entire set of facts that give rise to an enforceable claim. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action", in common legal parlance, is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors 2000 AIR (SC) 2966 :
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 393 - K T Thomas - Full Document

Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors vs Inspector Of Police, Chennai & Anr on 17 August, 2004

AIR 2004 SC 1998 ). The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra : AIR 2000 SC 2966 ; Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police : 2004 CriLJ 4180).
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 438 - A Pasayat - Full Document

Hari Shanker Jain vs Sonia Gandhi on 12 September, 2001

443. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense, cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Hari Shankar Jain vs. Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises 'cause of action'.
Supreme Court of India Cites 48 - Cited by 153 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie ... vs K.Suresh Reddy & Ors on 19 August, 2003

In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K.Suresh Reddy and others1 wherein the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the contours/limits of exercise of power by the Collector in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana) Area Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Section 50-B(4) of that Act conferred suo motu power on the Collector, `at any time' to call for and examine the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar under the said Section for purpose of satisfying himself as to legality or propriety of such certificate or as to the regularity of such proceeding or pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit. In paragraph (9) of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has clearly held that use of words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which suo motu power would be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. But, however, it was held that exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed to be so reckoned from a particular date. But that does not mean that exercise of power "at any time" should not be unguided and arbitrary. In that view the words "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable period of time depending upon facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of a prescribed period of limitation. It is therefore clear that even when a statute confers suo motu power to be exercised "at any time", such exercise is held as liable to be carried out within a reasonable period of time. In the instant case, the rules have prescribed a period of one year for exercise of suo motu power of revision by the superior authority. Even if this period of one year is to be construed as merely directory, but not in absolute terms, even in such circumstances, the suo motu power should be exercised in proximate closeness of such a period, which can be a reasonable one. When the rule making authority has chosen to prescribe one year period, a further period of one year can be construed as the maximum reasonable period for exercise of suo motu power. Therefore, suo motu power of revision cannot be exercised beyond 2 years period. I am conscious that while administering a large force like that of CISF, all orders of punishments imposed by the competent disciplinary or appellate authorities may not be processed to the next superior authorities as a matter of course or routinely and consequently the superior authorities may not be posted with all such developments on a regular basis. Hence, the superior authority may not come to know of such orders within that one year period of time, for an occasion to arise for him to consider the need to exercise suo motu power of revision. But, however, that factor alone cannot enlarge the time span indefinitely for exercise of power. In these set of circumstances, I am clearly of the view that exercise of power by the Commandant of the CISF in the instant case on 22.1.2001 which is more than three years after the original authority has passed the orders is beyond the reasonable period for exercise of suo motu power and hence the said order of the Commandant and as well as the order passed by the DIG, Northern Command, rejecting the appeal preferred there against are liable to be set aside.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 104 - S V Patil - Full Document
1   2 Next