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1 - 5 of 5 (0.20 seconds)Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Smt. Asho Devi vs Dukhi Sao And Ors. on 16 February, 1965
8. We will, therefore, first examine the correctness of the findings of fact reached by the learned Single Judge. There was some debate on the extent of the powers of this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal to examine the correctness of these findings. This question need not detain us for long. The Supreme Court has Ruled in Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, that the power of Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge in First Appeal is not limited only to the questions of law under section 100 C.P.C., but that it has the same power which the Single Judge himself had as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The constraints imposed by section 100 C.P.C. in the case of a second appeal are not applicable to a Division Bench hearing a Letters Paten Appeal. This is because, a second appeal is from the decision of Subordinate Court, while, a Single Judge is not subordinate to the High Court. It follows who have all the powers of a Single Judge to reach our own findings on questions of fact.
A.J. Tulloch vs M.P. Tulloch And Anr. on 30 July, 1974
13. We cannot forget that after all the detective agency were employed by the appellant for substantial reward and they had drawn a blank on a number of previous occasions. Detectives are understandably interested in the success of their investigation. Their clients expect positive results from them. The Court must view their evidence with utmost caution. Please see A.J. Tulloch v. M.P. Tulloch and 164 E.R. 1509 (1510) Sopwith v. Sopwith. We are clear that after having held that the testimony of the two witnesses was not worthy of credence, the learned trial Judge went wrong in lending credence to them to the limited extent that the Respondent and Ahuja had actually met in suspicious circumstances in the family cubicle of the New York Hotel. Indeed when the learned Judge had no hesitation in rejecting their assertion that they had seen the bare breasts of the respondent, being fondled by Ahuja, he should also have appreciated that such unscrupulous persons could also lie on other lesser facts. There are other reasons also which demonstrate the gross improbability of the appellant's charge.
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