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1 - 5 of 5 (0.21 seconds)Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882
Sailendra Narayan Bhanj Deo vs Assistant Collector Of Agricultural ... on 15 March, 1955
11. Mr. Pandey's argument is no doubt somewhat attractive. But to my mind, in the ultimate analysis, it will have to be rejected on the ground that it is too technical a plea. As stated above, the averment made by the plaintiff in para 6 of the application is not very happily made. Mr. Pandey is right in contending that so far as the cause of action arising out of the revocation dated 12-4-1965 was concerned, the same is no longer available to the plaintiff because that cause of action certainly had merged in the consent order dated 17-6-1968. Since I am taking this view it is unnecessary for me to refer to the Authorities relied upon by Mr. Pandey in support of his contention that the previous cause of action had merged in the consent order. But I may just refer to the said Authorities. The first Authority was , in the case of Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa. What has been decided in the said case was that the compromise decree in the said case was that the compromise decree in the fact of the case before the Court resulted in an estoppel against plaintiff from filing a second suit. I documents not think that this Authority can support the contention that the previous cause of action merged in the consent order.
The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
Bhanwarlal And Ors. vs Raja Babu And Ors. on 19 February, 1969
Mr. Pandey has also relied upon the judgment Rajasthan High Court, , Bhanwarlal v, Raja Babu. But even the principle decided in that case related to the estoppel of the plaintiff in view of the previous consent decree between the parties. But these Authorities documents not lay down any principle relating to merger. However, as stated above, to my mind the principle of merge formulated by Mr. Pandey is a correct principle and if the facts of the present case were different I would have no hesitation in holding that the case of action dated 12-4-1965 had merge in the consent order dated 17-6-1968 and the hence the second ejectment application on the same cause of action was not maintainable. But the difficulty for Mr. Pandey is that in the instant case in fact there has been a subsequent cause of action accruing for the plaintiff. I have already mentioned above that as per the consent order whatever was the legal character of the defendants possession before the 1st revocation continued even thereafter by virtue of the consent order. If defendants No. 1 was a former licensee he continued to be a licensee; but if he was a former tenant, he continued to be a tenant. The plaintiff is interested in saying that the continued to be a licensee. No doubt, he has also stated that the license cam to an end by virtue notice of revocation dated 12-4-1965, but that averment did not make him less of a licensee if he was a license did continue then the verifying of the execution application or even of the second ejectment application resulted in its revocation. This means that there did exist a fresh cause of action of the plaintiff for the section ejectment application though it was not mentioned in the relevant para of the plaint. This fresh cause of action is in no way affected by the previous consent order dated 17-6-1968. The doctrine of merger had no relevance whatsoever so far as this fresh cause of action is concerned.
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