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Margaret Lalita Samuel vs Indo Commercial Bank Ltd on 25 September, 1978 cites

Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others vs Sm. Deorajin Debi And Another on 20 April, 1960

The next question is about the legality and the consequences of the illegality, if any, of the original order of remand. It cannot be 927 disputed, and indeed it was not disputed before us, by Shri Mahajan, that the correctness of an order of remand passed by the High Court which could not then be questioned by filing an appeal in the Supreme Court against that order because such an appeal was not competent could nonetheless be challenged later in the appeal before the Supreme Court arising out of the final judgment pronounced in the action vide Satyadhyan Ghoshal & Ors v. Smt. Beorajin Debi & Anr.(1); Lonankutty v. Thomman & Anr.(2); Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hem Raj Multan Chand(3). It does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court will, every time, exercise its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution merely because it finds that the High Court had wrongly passed an order of remand at an earlier stage of the case. If the Supreme Court is satisfied that as a result of the order of remand substantial justice has been done to the parties in the consequential proceedings, the Supreme Court may decline to exercise its discretionary power to interfere. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is not meant to correct every illegality brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, nor to undo, merely on account of such illegality, an adjudication which has done substantial justice to the parties. On the other hand, Article 142 of the Constitution expressly confers powers upon the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In the case before us, the Bombay High Court no doubt found that on the material placed before it there was no option except to non- suit the plaintiff. The High Court, however, appears to have felt that the plaintiff bank which had rested its case in the Trial Court almost entirely on the acknowledgement dated 2nd February, 1952, was, perhaps misled into doing so because of the order passed by the Trial Judge on the application Exhibit 85, filed by the defendant. In the order dated 11th October, 1955, passed on the application Exhibit 85, the Trial Judge had observed that the defendant should have taken proper steps earlier if she wanted to dispute the debit items and that having failed to take proper steps she had to pay the penalty for her laches. That order might have made the, plaintiff believe that it was unnecessary to adduce any more evidence. Though the High Court did not expressly state that the plaintiff was misled by the order of the Trial Judge, it is clear from a perusal of the remand order of the High Court that the High Court felt that the order made on the application Exhibit 85, was responsible for the 928 failure of both the plaintiff and defendant to adduce appropriate evidence in regard to the several debit items. It was in those circumstances that the High Court, in the interests of justice, remanded the suit to the Trial Court in order to enable both parties to adduce necessary evidence regarding the items of debit. Whether or not the order of remand is capable of being justified under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of the view that the interests of justice have not suffered but on the other hand substantial justice has been done between the parties as a result of the subsequent proceedings. The Trial Court and the High Court have in their judgments fully and exhaustively discussed the liability of the defendant in regard to each of the debit items. In the special circumstances of this case we do not think that we will be justified in interfering with the decrees of the Lower Courts merely because the earlier order of remand passed by the High Court may not be capable of being justified.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 469 - K C Gupta - Full Document

Jasraj Inder Singh vs Hem Raj Multan Chand on 14 February, 1977

The next question is about the legality and the consequences of the illegality, if any, of the original order of remand. It cannot be 927 disputed, and indeed it was not disputed before us, by Shri Mahajan, that the correctness of an order of remand passed by the High Court which could not then be questioned by filing an appeal in the Supreme Court against that order because such an appeal was not competent could nonetheless be challenged later in the appeal before the Supreme Court arising out of the final judgment pronounced in the action vide Satyadhyan Ghoshal & Ors v. Smt. Beorajin Debi & Anr.(1); Lonankutty v. Thomman & Anr.(2); Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hem Raj Multan Chand(3). It does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court will, every time, exercise its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution merely because it finds that the High Court had wrongly passed an order of remand at an earlier stage of the case. If the Supreme Court is satisfied that as a result of the order of remand substantial justice has been done to the parties in the consequential proceedings, the Supreme Court may decline to exercise its discretionary power to interfere. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is not meant to correct every illegality brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, nor to undo, merely on account of such illegality, an adjudication which has done substantial justice to the parties. On the other hand, Article 142 of the Constitution expressly confers powers upon the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In the case before us, the Bombay High Court no doubt found that on the material placed before it there was no option except to non- suit the plaintiff. The High Court, however, appears to have felt that the plaintiff bank which had rested its case in the Trial Court almost entirely on the acknowledgement dated 2nd February, 1952, was, perhaps misled into doing so because of the order passed by the Trial Judge on the application Exhibit 85, filed by the defendant. In the order dated 11th October, 1955, passed on the application Exhibit 85, the Trial Judge had observed that the defendant should have taken proper steps earlier if she wanted to dispute the debit items and that having failed to take proper steps she had to pay the penalty for her laches. That order might have made the, plaintiff believe that it was unnecessary to adduce any more evidence. Though the High Court did not expressly state that the plaintiff was misled by the order of the Trial Judge, it is clear from a perusal of the remand order of the High Court that the High Court felt that the order made on the application Exhibit 85, was responsible for the 928 failure of both the plaintiff and defendant to adduce appropriate evidence in regard to the several debit items. It was in those circumstances that the High Court, in the interests of justice, remanded the suit to the Trial Court in order to enable both parties to adduce necessary evidence regarding the items of debit. Whether or not the order of remand is capable of being justified under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of the view that the interests of justice have not suffered but on the other hand substantial justice has been done between the parties as a result of the subsequent proceedings. The Trial Court and the High Court have in their judgments fully and exhaustively discussed the liability of the defendant in regard to each of the debit items. In the special circumstances of this case we do not think that we will be justified in interfering with the decrees of the Lower Courts merely because the earlier order of remand passed by the High Court may not be capable of being justified.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 17 - V R Iyer - Full Document

National And Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs Tikam Chand Daga And Anr. on 16 April, 1964

(1) Brajendra 923 Kishore Ray Chowdhury v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Tikam Chand Daga & Anr., and Uma Shankar Prasad v. Bank of Bihar Ltd. & Anr. In our view it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case to go into the question of the nature of an overdraft account. The present suit is in substance and truth one to enforce the guarantee bond executed by the defendant. In order to ascertain the nature of the liability of the defendant it is necessary to refer to the precise terms of the guarantee bond rather than embark into an enquiry as to the nature of an overdraft account. Exhibit 57 is the guarantee bond executed by the defendant and her husband on 23rd October, 1944. It is addressed to the Indo- Commercial Bank Ltd., Madras, and is in the following terms:
Calcutta High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Lonankutty vs Thomman & Another on 15 April, 1976

The next question is about the legality and the consequences of the illegality, if any, of the original order of remand. It cannot be 927 disputed, and indeed it was not disputed before us, by Shri Mahajan, that the correctness of an order of remand passed by the High Court which could not then be questioned by filing an appeal in the Supreme Court against that order because such an appeal was not competent could nonetheless be challenged later in the appeal before the Supreme Court arising out of the final judgment pronounced in the action vide Satyadhyan Ghoshal & Ors v. Smt. Beorajin Debi & Anr.(1); Lonankutty v. Thomman & Anr.(2); Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hem Raj Multan Chand(3). It does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court will, every time, exercise its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution merely because it finds that the High Court had wrongly passed an order of remand at an earlier stage of the case. If the Supreme Court is satisfied that as a result of the order of remand substantial justice has been done to the parties in the consequential proceedings, the Supreme Court may decline to exercise its discretionary power to interfere. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is not meant to correct every illegality brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, nor to undo, merely on account of such illegality, an adjudication which has done substantial justice to the parties. On the other hand, Article 142 of the Constitution expressly confers powers upon the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In the case before us, the Bombay High Court no doubt found that on the material placed before it there was no option except to non- suit the plaintiff. The High Court, however, appears to have felt that the plaintiff bank which had rested its case in the Trial Court almost entirely on the acknowledgement dated 2nd February, 1952, was, perhaps misled into doing so because of the order passed by the Trial Judge on the application Exhibit 85, filed by the defendant. In the order dated 11th October, 1955, passed on the application Exhibit 85, the Trial Judge had observed that the defendant should have taken proper steps earlier if she wanted to dispute the debit items and that having failed to take proper steps she had to pay the penalty for her laches. That order might have made the, plaintiff believe that it was unnecessary to adduce any more evidence. Though the High Court did not expressly state that the plaintiff was misled by the order of the Trial Judge, it is clear from a perusal of the remand order of the High Court that the High Court felt that the order made on the application Exhibit 85, was responsible for the 928 failure of both the plaintiff and defendant to adduce appropriate evidence in regard to the several debit items. It was in those circumstances that the High Court, in the interests of justice, remanded the suit to the Trial Court in order to enable both parties to adduce necessary evidence regarding the items of debit. Whether or not the order of remand is capable of being justified under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of the view that the interests of justice have not suffered but on the other hand substantial justice has been done between the parties as a result of the subsequent proceedings. The Trial Court and the High Court have in their judgments fully and exhaustively discussed the liability of the defendant in regard to each of the debit items. In the special circumstances of this case we do not think that we will be justified in interfering with the decrees of the Lower Courts merely because the earlier order of remand passed by the High Court may not be capable of being justified.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 65 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document
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