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1 - 10 of 10 (0.34 seconds)Section 161 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Balwant Singh vs State Of Haryana on 18 March, 1994
For holding this we rely on the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. State of Haryana , where the following principles are laid down :
Gurdip Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 2 February, 1971
In support of this submission he has cited before us the case of Gurdip Singh v. State (1995 (1) Apex Decisions Delhi 41). In view of the peculiar facts of the said case it was held that appellant Gurdip Singh was not guilty of the offence punishable under S. 302 of the IPC but he was guilty of the offence punishable under S. 304, Part I. In that case, deceased Murlidhar was quarrelling with one Ishwar and they were abusing each other. At that time appellant Gurdip Singh and one Ram Swarup intervened and separated both deceased Murlidhar and Ishwar and, thereafter, Ishwar went away but deceased Murlidhar for no reason picked up quarrel with the appellant. He not only caught hold of the appellant by his collar and gave him filthy abuses but also started physically struggling with him and in that heat of passion appellant, a Sikh gentleman, who was armed with Kirpan, gave blows of the same on the deceased. Therefore, in view of those peculiar circumstances we had found appellant guilty of the offence punishable under S. 304, Part I. But the facts of the case before us are quite distinguishable. In this case, admittedly, the appellant himself was the aggressor. He first attacked and assaulted PW 1, Zamir Ahmed and when he was questioned by deceased he again assaulted Zamir Ahmed in the presence of deceased and, therefore, deceased, who was the Uncle of PW 1, abused him and had also admonished him. The accused, thereafter, went away to his house and returned with a dagger-cum-chhuri and gave a forceful blow of the same on the chest of deceased. Therefore, in these circumstances, it could not be said that he had acted on account of any grave or sudden provocation. No doubt he has given a single blow but he had given the blow with a sharp edged weapon on the vital part of the body with great force. Therefore, in view of the fact that he had given the blow on the vital part of the body with force and with a dangerous and deadly weapon and when the deceased had not at that time done any wrong to him, it is quite obvious that he did intend to cause his death and he had knowledge that he was going to cause his death. Therefore, in these circumstances, we hold that he has been rightly held guilty of the offence punishable under S. 302 of the IPC.
Prithi Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 17 January, 1989
The said evidence of P.W. 15 is not challenged or discredited in his cross-examination. The said M.L.C. is prepared by Dr. Sundresh in discharge of his duty as a public servant and in due course of his business and occupation. Therefore, in these circumstances, the document Ex. PW. 15/A is admissible evidence. (See Prithi Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, .
Section 313 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 304 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
State (Delhi Administration) vs Khem Chand on 24 November, 1983
17. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited before us the case of State v. Khem Chand (1993 JCC 490) in support of his submission that there was delay in lodging the First Information Report and that the name of the accused was also not recorded in the daily diary. He is also relying on the same case for non-production of the blood stained clothes of the eye-witnesses. It must be mentioned here that the daily diary and First Information Report are recorded simultaneously and in the First Information Report the name of the appellant as well as the eye-witnesses is clearly mentioned and, therefore, the non-appearance of the names of the eye-witnesses in the daily diary entry is not of any serious consequence in this case. It must be further mentioned here that in the cross-examination of the eye-witnesses there is no cross-examination regarding the blood stains on their clothes. It is not known as to whether any blood stains had fallen on the clothes of the eye-witnesses or not. The Investigating Officer was also not cross-examined on that point. It is not brought on record through the cross-examination of eye-witnesses that as a matter of fact any blood stains had come on their clothes when they helped in putting the deceased in the rickshaw. Similarly, the Investigating Officer was also not cross-examined on this point and was not asked as to why he had not attached blood stained clothes of the eye-witnesses. Therefore, in these circumstances, no adverse inference could be drawn against the prosecution for non-attachment of the blood stained clothes of the prosecution witnesses.
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