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Abdullakhan Daryakhan Mhadik vs Purshottam Damodar Sura on 3 August, 1943 cites

Guntur Narasimham And Anr. vs Nyapati Narayana Rao Garu on 12 March, 1925

In Narasimham v. Narayan Rao (supra) there was a difference of opinion. Venkatasubba Rao J. held that a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to contest an alienation by a debtor was governed by Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, but the starting point of limitation was the date on which the plaintiff decided to exercise his option of avoiding the transfer, while Madhavan Nair J., while agreeing with him that such a suit was governed by Article 120, was of opinion that the starting point for limitation was not the date on which the creditor exercised the option to avoid the transfer nor the date of transfer, but it was the date on which the circumstances entitling the creditor to have the transfer avoided first became known to him. With respect, I find the reasons given by the former more convincing. Referring to the suggestion that the date of knowledge of the fraudulent transfer was the starting point of limitation he says (p. 68):
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Radhika Mohon Gope vs Hari Bashi Saha And Ors. on 16 March, 1933

6. On the point of limitation both the Courts have held that the suit is governed by Article 120 of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. On the strength of the ruling in Radika Mohan Gope v. Hari Bashi Saha (1933) 37 C. W. N. 1141 Mr. Coyajee contends that the appropriate article for such a suit is Article 91 and not Article 120. Article 91 provides a period of three years for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for, and the period of limitation begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. This suit is brought by the plaintiff under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, on his own behalf as well as on behalf of all the creditors of defendant No. 1 for a declaration that they are not bound by the sale-deed in suit. The plaintiff does not and cannot seek to have the sale-deed cancelled or set aside. Even on the allegations of the plaintiff the sale-deed is not absolutely void and will be binding on the executant defendant No. 1.
Calcutta High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Saburdas Mahasukhram Gandhi vs Gopalji Nandas Patel on 30 November, 1942

The plaintiff, who is not a party to the deed, merely wants to have a declaration that he and the other creditors of defendant No. I are not bound by it. There seems to be no ruling of this Court exactly in point, but in dealing with Article 95 which governs suits to set aside a decree obtained by fraud or for other relief on the ground of fraud a division bench of this Court, (of which I was a member), in Saburdas Mahasukkram v. Gopalji Nandas (1942) 45 Bom. L.R. 526 has held that the fraud contemplated by that article is fraud practised upon a party to the decree or a party to the transaction in which the fraud was committed. A stranger to a decree who is intended to be defrauded by it cannot sue to have it set aside, but he can have it declared that his interest cannot be affected by such a collusive decree. A suit for such a declaration does not, therefore, come within the purview of Article 95 but is governed by Article 120. This reasoning applies equally to Article 91.
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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