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Ram Narain Sahu And Anr. vs Mt. Makhna on 2 April, 1935 cites

Bal Krishna vs Ram Krishna on 19 March, 1931

16. Apart from this, in our judgment the application dated 3rd May 1924, filed by Makhna, was in the circumstances of the present case, sufficient to bring about separation between Ram Narain and Deo Narain, even if they be presumed to have continued to be joint till the date on which the application was filed. It is settled law that, the presumption of jointness, that holds good in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law, can be displaced by slight evidence pointing to the conclusion that the severance of the status of jointness was effected, either by an agreement amongst all the adult members of the family, or by a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by even one adult member of the family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. In the latter case it is open to the member indicating his intention to separate to put an end to jointness at his sweet will, even if the other members of the family do not agree to separation. Separation means the severance of the status of jointness and it is therefore a matter of individual volition. Whether there has been a clear, definite and unambiguous indication of an intention to separate by a member of a joint family is a question of fact, and the answer to that question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention to separate may be expressed in different ways either by explicit declaration or by conduct. One of the recognized modes in which such an intention may be expressed is either by serving a notice on the other co-parceners or by instituting a suit for partition, and in such cases the severance of the joint status is presumed from the date of the notice or from the date of the suit, vide Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain (1913) 35 All 80, Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj 1916 P.C. 104, Lalita Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple 1920 All 116, Ramlinga Annavi v. Narayan Annavi 1922 P.C. 201 and Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna 1931 P.C. 154. This is the general law, but it is not applicable in the case of persons who are under a legal disability for the simple reason that such persons are incompetent to give expression to an intention to separate.
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 19 - Full Document

Lalta Prasad vs Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple Through ... on 7 April, 1920

It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Lalta Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple 1920 All 116, that the institution of a suit by a minor member through his next friend for partition of joint family property has not the same effect as the institution of a similar suit by an adult member of the family, that is to say, the mere institution of the suit on behalf of a minor member does not effect a separation of the family, but separation only takes place when the suit is decreed. It was observed in that case that it would "open up great dangers" to hold that it is open to a next friend or a guardian of a minor to bring about an immediate alteration of the status in a family, that might otherwise be quite united, simply by the institution of a suit on behalf of the minor for partition:
Allahabad High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Ramalinga Annavi vs Narayana Annavi on 7 March, 1922

16. Apart from this, in our judgment the application dated 3rd May 1924, filed by Makhna, was in the circumstances of the present case, sufficient to bring about separation between Ram Narain and Deo Narain, even if they be presumed to have continued to be joint till the date on which the application was filed. It is settled law that, the presumption of jointness, that holds good in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law, can be displaced by slight evidence pointing to the conclusion that the severance of the status of jointness was effected, either by an agreement amongst all the adult members of the family, or by a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by even one adult member of the family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. In the latter case it is open to the member indicating his intention to separate to put an end to jointness at his sweet will, even if the other members of the family do not agree to separation. Separation means the severance of the status of jointness and it is therefore a matter of individual volition. Whether there has been a clear, definite and unambiguous indication of an intention to separate by a member of a joint family is a question of fact, and the answer to that question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention to separate may be expressed in different ways either by explicit declaration or by conduct. One of the recognized modes in which such an intention may be expressed is either by serving a notice on the other co-parceners or by instituting a suit for partition, and in such cases the severance of the joint status is presumed from the date of the notice or from the date of the suit, vide Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain (1913) 35 All 80, Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj 1916 P.C. 104, Lalita Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple 1920 All 116, Ramlinga Annavi v. Narayan Annavi 1922 P.C. 201 and Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna 1931 P.C. 154. This is the general law, but it is not applicable in the case of persons who are under a legal disability for the simple reason that such persons are incompetent to give expression to an intention to separate.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 26 - Full Document

Pandit Suraj Narain vs Pandit Ikbal Narain on 10 December, 1912

16. Apart from this, in our judgment the application dated 3rd May 1924, filed by Makhna, was in the circumstances of the present case, sufficient to bring about separation between Ram Narain and Deo Narain, even if they be presumed to have continued to be joint till the date on which the application was filed. It is settled law that, the presumption of jointness, that holds good in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law, can be displaced by slight evidence pointing to the conclusion that the severance of the status of jointness was effected, either by an agreement amongst all the adult members of the family, or by a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by even one adult member of the family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. In the latter case it is open to the member indicating his intention to separate to put an end to jointness at his sweet will, even if the other members of the family do not agree to separation. Separation means the severance of the status of jointness and it is therefore a matter of individual volition. Whether there has been a clear, definite and unambiguous indication of an intention to separate by a member of a joint family is a question of fact, and the answer to that question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention to separate may be expressed in different ways either by explicit declaration or by conduct. One of the recognized modes in which such an intention may be expressed is either by serving a notice on the other co-parceners or by instituting a suit for partition, and in such cases the severance of the joint status is presumed from the date of the notice or from the date of the suit, vide Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain (1913) 35 All 80, Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj 1916 P.C. 104, Lalita Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple 1920 All 116, Ramlinga Annavi v. Narayan Annavi 1922 P.C. 201 and Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna 1931 P.C. 154. This is the general law, but it is not applicable in the case of persons who are under a legal disability for the simple reason that such persons are incompetent to give expression to an intention to separate.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 62 - Full Document

Musammat Girja Bai vs Sadashiv Dhundiraj on 19 May, 1916

16. Apart from this, in our judgment the application dated 3rd May 1924, filed by Makhna, was in the circumstances of the present case, sufficient to bring about separation between Ram Narain and Deo Narain, even if they be presumed to have continued to be joint till the date on which the application was filed. It is settled law that, the presumption of jointness, that holds good in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law, can be displaced by slight evidence pointing to the conclusion that the severance of the status of jointness was effected, either by an agreement amongst all the adult members of the family, or by a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by even one adult member of the family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. In the latter case it is open to the member indicating his intention to separate to put an end to jointness at his sweet will, even if the other members of the family do not agree to separation. Separation means the severance of the status of jointness and it is therefore a matter of individual volition. Whether there has been a clear, definite and unambiguous indication of an intention to separate by a member of a joint family is a question of fact, and the answer to that question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention to separate may be expressed in different ways either by explicit declaration or by conduct. One of the recognized modes in which such an intention may be expressed is either by serving a notice on the other co-parceners or by instituting a suit for partition, and in such cases the severance of the joint status is presumed from the date of the notice or from the date of the suit, vide Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain (1913) 35 All 80, Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj 1916 P.C. 104, Lalita Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple 1920 All 116, Ramlinga Annavi v. Narayan Annavi 1922 P.C. 201 and Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna 1931 P.C. 154. This is the general law, but it is not applicable in the case of persons who are under a legal disability for the simple reason that such persons are incompetent to give expression to an intention to separate.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 140 - Full Document

Jag Prasad Rai vs Musammat Singari on 2 December, 1924

In Jag Prasad Rai v. Singari 1925 P.C. 93, it was held by their Lordships that when it is proved that there was separation of a joint Hindu family, it is for those who allege a reunion to prove it like any other fact, and the facts that after the separation certain members of the family lived in one and the same house, carried on business as partners and jointly paid Government revenue, are not sufficient to prove reunion.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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