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1 - 10 of 20 (0.22 seconds)Section 25 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 25F in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The Tata Engineering And Locomotive Co. ... vs S.C. Prasad And Anr. on 11 March, 1969
In this context, the following observations of the Supreme Court in the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. S.C. Prasad and another are quite opposite : ".. . . .those officers had reported that Dubey was terror in that division and that it. was not in the interests of the company to retain him in its service. In these circumstances it is manifestly wrong to say that the company acted mala fide or to victimise Dube because he was a leading member of the dissident group. To hold as would be tantamount to saying that even if an employer were to be satisfied that it was prejudicial to the interests of his concern to continue a workman in his service merely because that workman was an active union worker the order of discharge against him must he deemed to be mala fide or passed to victimise him. Certain workers who had participated in communal riots were, it is true, reinstated after some time while Dubey in spite of his applications was not. But from this fact it would not follow that the management had the intention to victimise him or that the order of discharge was a colourable exercise of the power to discharge under the standing orders."
The Bombay Union Of Journalists And ... vs The, Hindu', Bombay, And Another on 27 September, 1961
While clause (c) is only directory and can be treated as a condition subsequent (see Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd vs Shambhu Nath Mukherjee & Ors on 3 October, 1977
), the other two clauses embody conditions precedent (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. B.M. Mukherjee, 1978-1 Llj 1, S.C.)(15), the non-compliance with which will invalidate the retrenchment.
State 0F Bombay & Others vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Others on 29 January, 1960
In this case, the employee has been given the wages in lieu of notices under clause (a) but has not been paid the compensation under the clause (b) and this invalidates the retrenchment order vide : State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, . It is contended that, the factual position being clear from the order of termination itself, we should hold the order to be invalid for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25 F.
(18) On merits, the contention is clearly well-founded. Though there were some doubts earlier as to whether, notwithstanding the generality of the language of Section 2(00) and the exclusion from its purview of only four types of orders of termination, the expression should not be given a somewhat narrow connotation, the matter has now been setteled authoritatively.
Santosh Gupta vs State Bank Of Patiala on 29 April, 1980
It is sufficient to extract a portion of the headnote from Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of India (1980-2 Llj 72x17): "If the definition of "retrenchment" is looked at unaided an unhampered by precedent, one is at once struck by the remarkably wide language employed and perticularly by the use of the words "termination....for any reason whatsoever". The definition expressly exclude termination of services as a "punishment inflicted by way of disciplinnary action". The definition does not include, so it expressly says, voluntary retirement of a workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the servcie of the workman on the ground of continuous ill-health. Voluntary retirement of a workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation can hardly be described as termination, by the employer of the service of a workman. Yet the Legislature took special care to mention that they were not included within the meaning of "termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever".
Delhi Transport Corporation vs Delhi Administration And Ors. on 15 December, 1972
(6) At the outset we may point out that the question whether the employee is a workman or not is not a pure finding of fact. It is a mixed question of fact and law. In arriving at a conclusion the Labour Court has to first address itself to the various duties assigned to the workman and then draw a conclusion of law as to whether in the light of the duties assigned to him the employee would be a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act or not. Moreover, the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court to make an award in the dispute would depend upon a correct finding as to whether he is a workman or not. In other words this is a jurisdictional issue to be decided by the Tribunal, i.e., the Labour Court before it can assume jurisdiction to make an award in the dispute. The difference between the scope of judicial review of a jurisdictional fact and a finding of fact on the merits of the case has been explained by earlier decisions of this Court. Deshpande J. (as his lordship then was) in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Administration and others (1973 2nd I Delhi 838) (4) pointed out the above difference and took the view that a finding of a Tribunal on a jurisdictional fact would be fully reviewable and that in reviewing such a finding the High Court can arrive at an independent conclusion, but that, in reviewing a fact within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal, the High Court can act only if the finding is either baseless, i.e., not supported by any evidence at all or is perverse, i.e., is such as no reasonable person would arrive at but not otherwise.