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1 - 4 of 4 (0.18 seconds)Section 26A in Income Tax Rules, 1962 [Entire Act]
Malankara Timbers vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala. on 30 November, 1965
9. The Tribunal, in support of its view, has placed reliance upon a Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Malankara Timbers v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1967] 66 I.T.R 200 (Ker.).. It would be seen from the facts of that case that according to the recital as to the date of execution of the partnership deed, the date was March 1, 1959. Stamps had been purchased on March 23, 1959. Application for registration had been made on April 29, 1959. It was not actually known when the deed of partnership was signed and executed by the partners. In such a situation the Kerala High Court thought that it was signed some time between March 23 and April 29, 1959. The accounting year in question had commenced on April 1, 1959. That being so, the deed could not be taken to have covered the entire accounting year 1959-60. Refusal of registration was held to be justified on that ground. If the ratio of this case is taken to be correct, then it could have affected the assessee in regard to the questior of registration for the assessment year 1961-62, but not for the year 1962-63.
Imperial Automobiles vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 29 June, 1972
10. Mr. K.N. Jain, learned counsel for the assessee, placed reliance upon a recent decision of a Bench of the Madras High Court in Imperial Automobiles v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1973] 87 I.T.R. 695 (Mad.).. Facts were very much similar, and the Madras High Court took the view that the registration could not be refused merely because of the difference in the date of execution as recited and the date of actual execution. The learned judges constituting the Bench, however, thought that this could lead to a suspicion about the genuineness of the partnership, and since the Tribunal had not recorded any finding in that regard a further statement of the case was called for. The difference between the facts of the case before the Madras High Court and the instant one, to my mind, is so obvious that taking recourse to the calling for a further statement of the case by us was neither necessary nor would have been justified.
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