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M/S Harman Overseas And 3 Others vs Dongguan Tr Bearing Company Limited And ... on 4 August, 2017 cites

Jagdish Gopal Kamath And Others vs Lime & Chilli Hospitality Services P. ... on 22 April, 2013

32. As we have observed earlier, when a reply is filed to the Petition seeking leave under clause XIV of the Letters Patent, the Petition seeking leave under clause XIV of the Letters Patent cannot be decided on mere demurer and the Court will have to take into consideration the reply filed to the Petition seeking a leave under clause XIV of the Letters Patent. We may hasten to add here that while dealing with the Petition under clause XIV of the Letters Patent, the Court is not expected to record a final finding on the issue of jurisdiction or maintainability of the suit based on the first cause of action except when the Court exercises the power under Rule 11 of Order VII of the said Code. When the power of rejection of the Plaint is exercised, naturally, there will be no occasion to grant a leave under clause XIV of the Letters Patent. The learned Single Judge in the decision in the case of Jagdish Gopal Kamath Vs Lime and Chilli Hospitality Services (P) Ltd. has rightly held that the inquiry on the question whether the ::: Uploaded on - 07/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 08/08/2017 02:41:33 ::: sng 28 appeal-340,95n387.15 Plaintiff is entitled to grant of leave has to be minimal and the hearing of such Petitions cannot be allowed to be converted into hearing of interlocutory hearings.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 16 - S J Kathawalla - Full Document

Exphar Sa & Anr vs Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. & Anr on 20 February, 2004

38. In Appeal No.340 of 2015, the facts of the case have been already narrated in the earlier part of the judgment. The opposition of the Defendants to the Petition seeking a leave under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent is on the ground that the first Plaintiff was owner of the ::: Uploaded on - 07/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 08/08/2017 02:41:33 ::: sng 32 appeal-340,95n387.15 registered trademark which carries on business outside the jurisdiction of this Court. There is nothing placed on record to establish that the first Plaintiff has authorized the second Plaintiff to use its trademark. The contention was that under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, it was not enough to prove that the second Plaintiff was a distributor of the goods marketed by the first Plaintiff in India. It was contended that merely because the distributor was having its office within the jurisdiction of this Court, it cannot be said that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain an infringement action. It was pointed out that the preliminary issue of jurisdiction has been already framed. The learned Single Judge observed that for the purposes of application for grant of leave under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent, the Court will have to proceed on the footing that the second Plaintiff was a distributor and agent of the first Plaintiff. The learned Single Judge relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited which in turn relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Exphar Sa Vs. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 131 - R Pal - Full Document

Sir Tukojirao Holkar vs Sowkabai Pandharinath Rajapurkar on 11 September, 1928

The aforesaid are the brief facts under which the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant. We may now notice some judgments relevant for decision of the point in issue. A Division Bench of this Court in Tukojiro Holkar v. Sowkabai, reported in, while considering Clauses 12 and 14 of the Letters Patent and the provision of Order 2, Rule 3 and 4 Civil Procedure Code, has held that what is relevant is that one cause of action is within the jurisdiction of this Court. In the present case, cause of action in relation to infringement of copyright is admittedly within the jurisdiction of this Court."
Bombay High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Ultratech Cement Limited And 1 Ors vs Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited on 10 June, 2016

40. Now we turn to the Appeal No.387 of 2015 which arises out of Suit No.42 of 2014 (Ultratech Cement Limited and Another v. Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited). The case made out in the Plaint was that the first Plaintiff was a registered proprietor of the trade marks listed at Sr.Nos.2 to 7 whilst the second Plaintiff is a registered proprietor of the trade marks listed at Sr.Nos.1, 8 and 9. All these trade marks contain the word "Ultratech" or "Ultra" as a part of them. It is alleged that by the Deed of Assignment dated 30 th September 2009, the trade marks containing the word "Ultratech" or "Ultra" was assigned to the second Plaintiff alongwith the goodwill of the business. Reliance is also placed on the License Agreement dated 29 th June 2011. By the said License Agreement, the second Plaintiff has permitted the first Plaintiff to use the trade marks containing the word "UltraTech" or "Ultra". It is alleged that the words "Ultra" and "Tech" are the essential and prominent features of the registered mark bearing the word ::: Uploaded on - 07/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 08/08/2017 02:41:33 ::: sng 34 appeal-340,95n387.15 "UltraTech". It was alleged that the Defendant/Appellant has started using a mark containing the word "Ultra" and that the trade mark of the Defendant is identical with or deceptively similar to the "UltraTech" trademark and, therefore, such user by the Defendant will amount to an infringement of the "UltraTech" trade marks. The objection of the Defendant was that this Court had no jurisdiction in respect of the cause of action for infringement as only a registered proprietor or a registered user can maintain a suit for infringement. It was contended that the second Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit containing action for infringement under Sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act since it cannot be said to be ordinarily residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. In this case, the Defendant had applied under Order VII Rule 11 of the said Code on the ground that only the second Plaintiff cannot file a suit for infringement as a registered proprietor of the trademark and that the principal place of its business was outside the jurisdiction of this Court. While dismissing the prayer for rejection of the Plaint, the learned Single Judge held that the Court would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit under Sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act even if the Plaintiff only had its subordinate office and not its principal office within the jurisdiction of this Court. In this case, the second Plaintiff has a subordinate office within the jurisdiction of this Court. An Appeal against the said order of rejection of the Application for rejection of the ::: Uploaded on - 07/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 08/08/2017 02:41:33 ::: sng 35 appeal-340,95n387.15 Plaint was dismissed by the Division Bench by granting liberty to the Defendant to take out appropriate proceedings including an application under Section 9A of the said Code. In our view, while dealing with the Petition under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent, in view of the earlier order of the learned Single Judge which was confirmed in Appeal, it was not necessary for the learned Single Judge to go into the prima facie consideration of the issue whether the suit was maintainable under Sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Mark Act. Nevertheless, the learned Single Judge has dealt with the same and negatived it. Prima facie view expressed by the learned Single Judge is that there was no need to read words in the nature of the explanation to Section 20 in Sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. According to us, the learned Single Judge has considered the defence of the Defendant to the leave application and has held more than minimal inquiry and has recorded a prima facie finding that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit containing the cause of action for infringement. We do not find any perversity attached to the approach or findings recorded by the learned Single Judge.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 11 - S C Gupte - Full Document
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