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1 - 10 of 14 (0.20 seconds)Section 33 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Section 40 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Section 64 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Section 27 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Duncans Industries Ltd vs State Of U.P. & Ors on 3 December, 1999
When the Additional Chief Standing Counsel argued by taking support of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Duncans Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC 355 then definitely the Court went through that judgment and found that it was with regard to transfer which had taken place on account of a deed. If paragraph 10 of the judgment is seen, then it becomes clear that even the deed which was the subject matter before the Stamp Authorities was a sale deed which contained the details of all the plant etc. which were being transferred. In the instant case, if the lease deed is perused it would become apparently clear that only the land measuring 19992.78 sq. meters, [11000 sq. meters (66% of the land) which was transferred by the transferee company], was to be registered and, therefore, the Court is also of the view that the Prescribed Authority erred in law while taking into account the plant and machinery which were situate over the land in question. The Court also finds from the order dated 28.8.2017 that the Prescribed Authority i.e. the Collector had relied upon the submissions made by the District Government Counsel who had argued the matter and had laid stress on the issue that the petitioner had not appeared for almost 70 dates. The Court is of the view that this fact should have definitely been taken into account and the Collector should have at least issued a notice to the petitioner to appear in the case. The Court is also of the view that when the Executive Engineer had come up with the report and had stated in the report that the petitioner had created hindrance at the time of inspection then also the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to rebut the averments made in the report. Still further, the Court is of the view that the stamp Authority passed the order relying upon an ex-parte report dated 11.1.2008 of the Sub-Registrar, Gautam Budh Nagar. The ex-parte report could have been used for initiating a case but it could not have been used for deciding the case. Even if the Collector had to decide the case without issuing notice to the petitioner then it would have been in the fitness of things that he should have visited the spot in question and should thereafter have concluded as to what was the valuation on which the stamp duty ought to have been imposed. Still further, the Court is of the view that no reason has been given while imposing the penalty.
M/S. Hero Motors Ltd vs C.C.E. Gaziabad (U.P) on 28 November, 2013
Further the Court finds that two firms had merged by an order of the Delhi High Court dated 22.11.2006 wherein it was held that the stamp duty, if any was payable by the transferee company, would be paid in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that any stamp duty which was payable on a merger had to be paid as per the law laid down in the judgment reported in 2009 (1) ADJ 569 : M/s. Hero Motors Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Others and therefore, the question for paying stamp duty on the plant and machinery again did not arise. The Court definitely is of the view that the Prescribed Authority ought to have looked into this aspect of the matter. The merger had taken place between the transferor company namely M/s. Super Seals India Limited and the transferee company namely Super Seal Flexible Hose Limited as per the order of the Delhi High Court dated 22.11.2006. If any stamp duty had to be imposed, it must have been imposed at that point of time itself. What is more, the Court finds that even the stamp duty which was leviable at the time of the merger/demerger was also not a point in issue in the instant case. The only issue which was there before the Prescribed Authority was as to what was the property which was being leased out by the UPSIDC to the petitioner-company. The Court finds that only the land was the subject matter of the transfer by means of a lease.