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1 - 10 of 15 (0.21 seconds)Section 42 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 41 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 86 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Ishwar Dutt vs Land Acquisition Collector And Anr on 2 August, 2005
15. Learned counsel while placing reliance on the
said judgment, has taken this Court to the provisions of
Sections 41 to 45 of Indian Evidence Act and has placed
reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Ishwar
Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others1 and
Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha vs. Ram Niwas & Others2.
Relying on these two judgments, he would vehemently
argue and contend that the findings recorded by this Court
in RSA.No.1059/2001 c/w RSA.No.17/2002 is given a
quietus insofar as location of the properties are concerned
and therefore, the principles of res judicata are squarely
1
MANU/SC/0477/2005
2
MANU/SC/7674/2008
13
applicable and therefore, defendants are estopped from
disputing the location under Section 11 of CPC.
Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) vs Mahant Ram Niwas & Anr on 12 May, 2008
15. Learned counsel while placing reliance on the
said judgment, has taken this Court to the provisions of
Sections 41 to 45 of Indian Evidence Act and has placed
reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Ishwar
Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others1 and
Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha vs. Ram Niwas & Others2.
Relying on these two judgments, he would vehemently
argue and contend that the findings recorded by this Court
in RSA.No.1059/2001 c/w RSA.No.17/2002 is given a
quietus insofar as location of the properties are concerned
and therefore, the principles of res judicata are squarely
1
MANU/SC/0477/2005
2
MANU/SC/7674/2008
13
applicable and therefore, defendants are estopped from
disputing the location under Section 11 of CPC.
Bhanu Kumar Jain vs Archana Kumar & Anr on 17 December, 2004
16. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered in the
case of Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar3, he
would contend that res judicata debars a Court from
exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis. He would
conclude his arguments by contending that if such an issue
is decided against a party, he would be estopped from
raising the same in the latter proceedings. He would also
argue and contend that Doctrine of res judicata creates a
different kind of estoppel viz., estoppel by accord.
Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & Ors vs Tehmtan Irani & Ors on 25 April, 2014
17. While placing reliance on the judgment rendered
by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in RSA.No.1059/2001
c/w RSA.No.17/2002, he has placed reliance on the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Gaiv Dinshaw Irani and Others vs. Tehmtan Irani and
3
AIR 2005 SC 626
14
Others4. Placing reliance on the said judgment, he would
contend that the Courts can take cognizance of subsequent
development which would have a direct bearing on the lis.
Therefore, he would vehemently argue and contend that
the subsequent events of fact or law which have a material
bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief, Courts
are not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the
subsequent changes of facts and it is well within the
jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to mould and grant
appropriate reliefs.
Kharkan And Others vs The State Of U.P on 29 August, 1963
18. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
defendants would, however, counter the arguments
canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiffs. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kharkan and Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh5, he would contend that the
earlier judgment though admissible but, however, he would
4
MANU/SC/0475/2014
5
AIR 1965 SC 83
15
contend that it is not admissible for the purpose of relying
upon the appreciation of evidence. Placing reliance on the
judgment cited supra, he would contend that the judgment
rendered by this Court in RSA.No.1059/2001 c/w
RSA.No.17/2002, is not at all relevant while assessing the
evidence in the present case on hand. He would
vehemently argue and contend that the judgment of the
Courts are admissible in evidence under the provisions of
Sections 40 to 42 of Indian Evidence Act and those
judgments which do not fall within four corners of Sections
40 to 42 are inadmissible unless the existence of such
judgments is itself a fact in issue or a relevant fact under
some other provisions of Evidence Act. Therefore, he would
contend that the judgment rendered by this Court in
RSA.No.1059/2001 c/w RSA.No.17/2002 is not at all
relevant as it does not fulfill the conditions laid down by the
Indian Evidence Act under Sections 40 to 42.