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1 - 9 of 9 (0.45 seconds)Section 25 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 45 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
C. Govindarajulu Naidu & Co. vs State Of Madras Represented By The ... on 9 September, 1952
12. In the present case, the return which has been found to be false was submitted on behalf of the firm ; but it was signed by A-3 alone. Since the section contemplates wilfulness and therefore metis rea, there can be no doubt that A-3 who submitted the false return is liable. But could petitioners 1, 4 and 5 who personally had nothing to do with the submission of the return be also held liable is the question. The principle as stated in Halsbury (vide Vol. 10, Simonds, 3rd Edition, page 275, para. 511) is when a particular intent or state of mind is of the essence of an offence, the person committing the act is not criminally responsible if he had no metis rea and the act was ordered or procured by another person ; but the person who ordered or procured the act is criminally responsible. It is a general principle of criminal law that there must be some blame-worthy condition of mind or metis rea. Therefore, on the reasoning in Govindarajulu v. State [1951] 2 S.T.C. 26, unless it is shown that accused 1, 4 and 5 knew about the exclusion of certain items from the return or of its falsity, there can be no question of wilfulness much less metis rea so far as they are concerned. They cannot, therefore, beheld criminally liable. In this view of the matter, the other petitioners, namely petitioners I, 3 and 4 are entitled to an acquittal in this case. They are accordingly acquitted. The conviction and sentence of A-3 (petitioner 2) are confirmed. The fine, if recovered from the petitioners A-1, A-4 and A-5, will be refunded to them.
Section 14 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 15 in Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 [Entire Act]
K.T.K.A. Alagappa Chettiar And Ors. vs Emperor on 5 April, 1932
Relying on the observations of Govinda Menon, J., in Jayarama Chettiar v. Emperor 1948 M.W.N. (Crl.) 29, the learned Judge held that the word had been inserted in Section 15 to exclude cases of inadvertence or mistake but not cases where the omission was made due to wrong view of the law or ignorance of the law.
Public Prosecutor vs Syed Rowther And Anr. on 21 April, 1961
6. The learned Presidency Magistrate distinguished this case by stating that officers under the Madras General Sales Tax Act are not police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. He further relied on Public Prosecutor v. Syed Rowther 1961 M.W.N. (Crl.) 177, which has held that Section 14 of the Act does not invest the officers of the department with the powers of the police officers.
State vs Kaikhushroo Merwan Irani And Ors. on 4 July, 1958
5. The learned Magistrate was not prepared to accept this story. On the other hand, in view of the statement made by A-3 in exhibit P-2 he was satisfied that exhibit P-1 contained entries of transactions of the firm. It was next contended that exhibit P-2 was inadmissible in evidence and reliance was placed on the ruling in State v. Kaikhushroo Merwan Irani [1958] 9 S.T.C. 681. That was a case where the accused was charged with the offence of knowingly submitting false returns under Section 36 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The evidence that was produced to prove the charge was a statement admitting the offence made by the accused to the Sales Tax Officer who was authorised by the Collector to investigate the offence. The Bombay High Court held that the Sales Tax Officer would be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore the statement made to that officer, which amounted to a confession, was not admissible in evidence.
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