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1 - 10 of 21 (0.40 seconds)The Societies Registration Act, 1860
Article 41 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972
Article 16 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Randhir Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 February, 1982
Similarly when this Court in Randhir
Singh's case (supra) held that the principle of 'equal pay
for equal work' may be properly applied to cases of unequal
pay based on no classification or irrational classification
it enlarged the class of beneficiaries. Therefore, the
principle of 'severance' for taking out the unconstitutional
provision from an otherwise constitutional measure has been
well recognised. It would be just and proper that the
provision in the memoranda while retaining the date for its
implementation, but providing 'that in respect of Government
servants who were in service on the 31st March, 1979 but
retiring from service in or after that date' can be legally
and validly severed and must be struck down. The date is
retained without qualification as the effective date for
implementation of scheme, it being made abundantly clear
that in respect of all pensioners governed by 1972 Rules,
the pension of each may be recomputed as on April 1, 1979
and future payments be made in accordance with fresh
computation under the liberalised pension scheme as enacted
in the impugned memoranda. No arrears for the period prior
to 31st March, 1979 in accordance with revised computation
need be paid.
Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 31 July, 1980
To some extent this approach will find support in the
judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors.(1). Speaking for the majority, Chandrachud, C.J.
observed as under :
D.R. Nim, I. P. S vs Union Of India on 5 January, 1967
In D.R. Nim v. Union of India(1) the
appellant questioned his seniority which was to be
determined in accordance with the provisions contained in
Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954.
These rules required first to ascertain the year of
allotment of the person concerned for the determination of
his seniority. In doing so, the Government of India directed
that officers promoted to the Indian Police Service should
be allowed the benefit of their continuous officiation with
effect only from 19th May, 1951. The appellant challenged
the order because the period of officiation from June 1947
to May 1951 was excluded for the purpose of fixation of his
seniority. His grievance was that there was no rationale
behind selecting this date. After taking into consideration
affidavit in opposition, this Court held as under :
Jaila Singh & Anr vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors on 2 May, 1975
We may now deal with the last submission of the learned
Attorney General on the point. Said the learned Attorney-
General that principle of severability cannot be applied to
augment the class and to adopt his words 'severance always
cuts down the scope, never enlarges it'. We are not sure
whether there is any principle which inhibits the Court from
striking down an unconstitutional part of a legislative
action which may have the tendency to enlarge the width and
coverage of the measure. Whenever classification is held to
be impermissible and the measure can be retained by removing
the unconstitutional portion of classification, by striking
down words of limitation, the resultant effect may be of
enlarging the class. In such a situation, the Court can
strike down the words of limitation in an enactment. That is
what is called reading down the measure. We know of no
principle that 'severance' limits the scope of legislation
and can never enlarge it. To refer to the Jaila Singh's case
(supra), when for the benefit of allotment of land the
artificial division between pre-1955 and post-1955 tenant
was struck down by this Court, the class of beneficiaries
was enlarged and the cake in the form of available land was
a fixed quantum and its distribution amongst the larger
class would protanto reduce the quantum to each beneficiary
included in the class.
S.P. Gupta vs Union Of India & Anr on 30 December, 1981
Locus standi of third petitioner was questioned.
Petitioner No. 3 is a Society registered under the Societies
Registration Act of 1860. It is a non-political non-profit
and voluntary organisation. Its members consist of public
spirited citizens who have taken up the cause of ventilating
legitimate public problems. This Society received a large
number of representations from old pensioners, individually
unable to undertake the journey through
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labyrinths of legal judicial process, costly and protracted,
and. therefore, approached petitioner No. 3 which espoused
their cause Objects for which the third petitioner-Society
was formed were not questioned. The majority decision of
this Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India(1) rules that any
member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain
an action for judicial redress for public injury arising
from breach of public duty or from violation of some
provision of the Constitution or the law and seek
enforcement of such public duty and observance of such
constitutional or legal provision. Third petitioner seeks to
enforce rights that may be available to a large number of
old infirm retirees. Therefore, its locus standi is
unquestionable. But it is a point of academic important
because locus standi of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 was never
questioned.