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1 - 5 of 5 (0.17 seconds)Section 125 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Kunhammed Haji vs Amina on 31 March, 1995
11. The precise question was considered by this Court in the decision in 1990 (1) KLT 192. Jagannatha Raju, J. in that decision has clearly held that it is not the requirement of Section 3 of the Act that the divorced wife must be unable to maintain herself before she can claim amounts under Section 3. I am in total agreement with the law so laid down and the incidental observations made by the Division Bench in Kunhammed Haji's case (supra), cannot alter the said conclusion which flows directly from the language of Section 3. The Division Bench has not overruled the dictum in 1990 (1) KLT 192. The Legislature is conscious of the rights of the wives professing other religions under Section 125, Cr.P.C., when enacted Section 3 did not choose to weave into Section 3 the requirement that the divorced wife must be unable to maintain herself.
Ahammed vs Aysha on 21 December, 1989
It is not necessary to advert to certain precedents by other High Courts inasmuch as from the language of Section 3 and from the precedent, which has remained from 1990 in Ahammeed v. Aysha (supra), the position is well laid down and need not be doubted. I may clarify that even a millionaire wife will be entitled to claim amounts under Section 3 of the Act from her billionaire husband and the fact that she can maintain herself is no bar against any claim under Section 3. In these circumstances the fact that the claimant divorced Muslim wife is able to maintain herself and is not unable to maintain herself can have no bearing on her right under Section 3(1)(a) though it may have relevance while ascertaining the quantum.
Noor Saba Khatoon vs Mohd. Quasim on 29 July, 1997
'Para 8': Indeed Section 3(1) of 1986 Act begins with a non obstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" and Slause (b) thereof provides that a divorced woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision for maintenance by her former husband to maintain the children born out of the wedlock for a period of two years from the date of birth of such children, but the non obstante clause in our opinion only restricts and confines the right of a divorcee Muslim woman to claim or receive maintenance for herself and for maintenance of the child/children till they attain the age of two years, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in that behalf. It has nothing to do with the independent right or entitlement of the minor children to be maintained by their Muslim father. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 125, Cr.P.C. and Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act makes it clear that the two provisions apply and cover different situations and there is no conflict, much less a real one, between the two. Whereas the 1986 Act deals with the obligation of a Muslim husband vis-a-vis his divorced wife including the payment of maintenance to her for a period of two years of fosterage for maintaining the infant/infants, where they are in the custody of the mother, the obligation of a Muslim father to maintain the till children is governed by Section 125, Cr.P.C. and his obligation to maintain them is absolute till they attain majority or are able to maintain themselves, whichever date is earlier. In the case of female children this obligation extends till their marriage. Apart from the statutory provisions referred to above, even under the Muslim Personal Law, the right of minor children to receive maintenance from their father, till they are able to maintain themselves, is absolute.
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