In fact,
in Sukhbir Singh (supra), the Court refused to accept the plea that physical
possession was not taken. This decision, therefore, is not helpful to the
Petitioners.
7. It is contended by the Petitioners that although Section 17 of the LAA was
invoked, the Respondents did not "even take physical possession of the suit
property much less commencement of the development for the alleged
purpose." Mr. Gupta relied upon on the decisions in Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 and Delhi
Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh AIR 2016 SC 4275 to urge that as
W.P.(C) 5647/2016 & connected matters Page 5 of 12
long as possession of the plot remained with the Petitioners, it would not
matter if they had received compensation since one of the conditions
specified under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act stood fulfilled and this was
sufficient for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings were
deemed to have lapsed. It is stated that on 8th June, 2016, the DDA unloaded
bricks near the suit property with mala fide intention of raising a boundary
wall.
16. Once the compensation has been admittedly received in full and the
Petitioners have in writing conveyed to the LAC that they gave up
possession on 5th September, 2002 itself, the only inference could be that
which is noticed in Suresh Nand Juyal (supra) that the Petitioners have
again trespassed into the land after surrendering it. Consequently, none of
the conditionalities attached to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act is fulfilled in
the present case.