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1 - 10 of 12 (0.22 seconds)Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 118 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Rangappa vs Sri Mohan on 7 May, 2010
In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, this Court has
reiterated and summarised the principles relating to
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act
and rebuttal thereof in the following : (SCC pp. 453-54,
paras 26-28)
"26. In the light of these extracts, we are in
agreement with the respondent claimant that
the presumption mandated by Section 139 of
Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel vs The State Of Gujarat on 1 February, 2021
NC: 2024:KHC:48935
CRL.A No. 999 of 2014
"13. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on
a plain reading of its judgment that the trial court
completely overlooked the provisions and failed to
appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under
Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The statute
mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused
on the cheque/negotiable instrument are
established, then these "reverse onus" clauses
become operative. In such a situation, the
obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the
presumption imposed upon him. This point of law
has been crystallised by this Court in Rohitbhai
Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following
words : (SCC pp. 120-21, para 18)
"18. In the case at hand, even after
purportedly drawing the presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court
proceeded to question the want of evidence
on the part of the complainant as regards the
source of funds for advancing loan to the
accused and want of examination of relevant
witnesses who allegedly extended him money
for advancing it to the accused. This approach
of the trial court had been at variance with the
principles of presumption in law. After such
presumption, the onus shifted to the accused
and unless the accused had discharged the
onus by bringing on record such facts and
circumstances as to show the preponderance
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani vs State Of Kerala & Anr on 4 July, 2006
15. No doubt, and as correctly argued by
Senior Counsel for the appellants, the
presumptions raised under Sections 118 and
Section 139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in
M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, which was
relied upon in Basalingappa, a probable defence
needs to be raised, which must meet the standard
of "preponderance of probability", and not mere
possibility. These principles were also affirmed in
Kumar Exports, wherein it was further held that a
bare denial of passing of consideration would not
aid the case of accused.
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Bir Singh vs Mukesh Kumar on 6 February, 2019
22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent decision in
Kalamani Tex and another V. P.Balasubramanian5 by
referring to its earlier decision including Basalingappa
(supra), Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel (supra), Bir Singh (supra),
reiterated the position of law in paragraph Nos. 13, 15 and 17
as under: