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1 - 10 of 11 (0.36 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Smt. A.N.Kapoor vs Smt. Pushpa Talwar on 31 January, 1992
(13) Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the view taken in the aforesaid authorities stands impliedly overruled by a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. A.N. Kapoor vs. Smt. Pushpa Talwar, . to the effect that if the premises let out for residential purposes are regularly ai.d openly used for lodging paying guest with the knowledge of and implied consent of the landlord, the premises cease to be residential. The authority is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case and the argument advanced is fallacious.
Sushila Devi And Ors. vs A.C. Jain And Ors. on 11 January, 1988
(29) There is, thus, no force in the contentions raised for the petitioner assailing the findings of the Addl. Rent Controller on the various aspects, noticed above, having a bearing on the question of bonafide requirement of the respondent. The finding of the learned Rent Controller and the conclusion reached allowing the eviction petition are in order. My belief is further strengthened on the test of comparative need of the landlord and tenant, noticed by Goswamy J. in Sushila Devi's case (supra). On the one hand is a landlord aged 88 years, who was able to acquire a house in Delhi during his life career, being bounded, evicted and thus shifting to another place, in the fond hope of getting his house back to live comfortably with his family at the fag end of his life. On the other hand is a big company of standing, in occupation of 15 to 20 other properties on rent (as stated by petitioner's General Manager, RW5) and having resources to acquire an other place for the residence of its Managing Director and/or for its guest house. The order for eviction, even according to the test of comparative need cannot be said to be wrong and is confirmed.
Jagatjit Industries Ltd. vs Sh. Rajiv Gupta on 25 September, 1980
(12) Letting purpose is to be determined from the terms of the lease deed. In the present case, as per stipulation in clause 3 of the lease deed,Ex.A-3,IT is "for the residential purposes of the Managing Director as also for the purpose of the official guest house." Clause 4 of the said lease provides that the premises shall not be used for the purpose of any trade or business nor shall they be used for any purpose barred by the rules, bye- laws........etc. The terms of the lease deed, read as a whole,leave little scope for doubt that the letting purpose was residential. It does not cease to be so if besides residence of company's Managing Director it is let out also for the purpose of use as a guest house by the company's officers or otherwise used as such. This has been the consistent view of this Court taken in M/s. Jagatjit Industries Ltd. vs. Shri Rajiv Gupta, 1980 (2) Rcj 769, Mst.
Section 25B in The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao And Ors. vs Valluri Jagannadha Rao And Ors. on 18 December, 1945
In support, reliance was placed on Pulavarthi Venkata Suhba Rao and others vs. Valluri Jugunnadha Rao (deceased) etc., . This authority holds that a compromise decree might create an estoppel by conduct but can not operate as res judicata between the parties as the matter cannot be said to be heard and finally decided, does not advance the petitioner's case.
Y. Rajeshwari vs Bombay Tyres International Ltd. on 8 November, 1988
Ganesh Flour Mills vs Ramesh Chand on 24 May, 1979
(9) EX. A-3 is the lease deed between the parties, which unequivocally records that the H.U.F. of A.P.Bagai and his son is the owner of the premises in question which had been let out to the petitioner by A.P.Bagai in his capacity as Karta of the said H.U.F. He has signed the lease deed as such. There has been no change in the status of the parties except that the lease has expired by efflux of time. It is thus, not open to the petitioner to challenge that the H.U.F. is not the owner of the premises in question. Support is lent to this view by Ganesh Floor Mills vs. Ramesh Chand.
Narayan Das Sunderlal Rathi vs Tejmal Mohanlal And Ors. on 29 November, 1932
(10) Devi Das vs. MohanLal. , relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, to contend that the tenant is entitled to challenge the title of the landlord on the plea that the transfer in his favor is sham, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The authority holds that on petition under section 14(l)(e) of the Act being filed, based on a sale deed, it is open to the tenant to challenge its validity and show that the sale deed is a sham transaction. In that case, the plea raised by the tenant was that the alleged sale under sale deed executed in favor of one Mohan Lal, by his father Jugal Kishore, as attorney to Jagiri Lal and Vasdev, was sham and the sale deed was executed only to provide a ground for eviction of the tenant, as earlier application filed by Jugal Kishore as attorney of Jagiri Lal and Vasdev for ejectment of the tenant from the premises had failed. The appellate authority did not permit the tenant to refer to the evidence adduced on the point and rejected the tenant's case, taking the view that the tenant could not challenge the validity of the sale deed executed in favor of Mohan Lal, the vendee, as the tenant was not a party to it. The High Court had not adverted to this aspect of the matter. In Special Leave petition, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree for eviction and remitted the case to the trial court to consider the evidence recorded on the point and record a finding on the question whether the sale of the building to Mohan Lal was a bona fide transaction. Not so here. The sale in the present case is not and cannot be impeached as a sham transaction. The sale is admitted. The plea is that it is in favor of A.P. Bagai as individual and not to H.U.F. as it ostensibly purports to be, which, for the aforesaid reasons, I am not persuaded to hold. In the present case, the sale was unmistakably in favor of HUF. The ratio of the said judgment is, thus, not applicable to the facts of the case in hand.